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Desegregation is a key policy issue in many countries. I investigate a residential
desegregation program in Singapore - the ethnic housing quotas. I show that choice
restrictions imposed on apartment blocks above the quota limits (constrained) could
have distortionary effects, causing price and quantity differences for constrained ver-
sus unconstrained blocks. I test these predictions by hand-matching more than 500,000
names in the phonebook to ethnicities, to calculate ethnic proportions at the apart-
ment block level. I can then investigate differences for constrained and unconstrained
blocks close to the quota limits and test for sorting around the limits. I find price
differences are between 3% and 5%. Quantity effects are economically significant,
translating to longer time-on-market durations by 1 to 1.4 months. Selection cannot
fully explain these results. My results point to challenges in achieving desegregation
using quantity restrictions.
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1 Introduction
Around the world, there are many policies encouraging gender and ethnic diversity in
education, public and private employment, politics, and housing.1 Countries commit large
amounts of money in their budgets to encourage diversity.2 In addition to these budget
amounts, there could also be unintended distortionary costs introduced by these policies.
There is a large literature on the redistributive benefits of these policies, but there is less
on distortionary costs (Holzer and Neumark, 2000). I investigate potential policy-induced
distortionary costs using a natural experiment in Singapore - the ethnic housing quota
policy.
The quota policy was introduced in 1989 to prevent further segregation amongst the
three major ethnic groups in Singapore – Chinese (77%), Malays (14%) and Indians (8%)
(Singapore Department of Statistics, 2000). The policy is a set of limits on Chinese, Malay
and Indian proportions that determine which ethnic groups are “segregated” in an area.3
In areas above the quota limit, sellers from the non-segregated group cannot sell to buyers
from the segregated group because this transaction increases the ethnic proportion of the
segregated group farther above the quota limit. I quantify the distortionary effects of these
policy restrictions by comparing housing transaction outcomes for constrained areas sub-
ject to the restrictions and comparable unconstrained areas. To my knowledge, this is the
first paper to investigate distortionary effects of a residential desegregation policy using
housing transactions.4
To do this, I develop a conceptual framework that delivers testable predictions on how
prices and quantities are expected to differ for apartment blocks that are above the quota
1See Holzer and Neumark (2000) for a review of diversity policies in education, employment and gov-
ernment procurement in the United States. Around 100 countries have adopted gender quotas in politics
(Krook, 2009). See Polikoff (1986) and Boustan (2011) for a review of residential desegregation policies.
See Sowell (2004) for a survey of diversity-enhancing policies for other countries.
2In the United States, government procurement is estimated at 10% of GDP and commonly includes
preferential treatment to disadvantaged groups (Marion, 2009). In the European Union, large sums of money
are dedicated to promoting a multiculturalism model of integration, including the European Integration Fund
(US$1 billion) and the European Social Fund (US$92.3 billion). In Sweden and the Netherlands, the annual
integration budget ranged from US$615 million to US$738 million.
3For example, if the percent of Chinese in an area is above the quota limit for Chinese, then, the Chinese
are “segregated”, as defined by the Chinese quota limit.
4There is a vast empirical literature on the causes and consequences of residential segregation (See,
for example, Bayer, McMillan, and Rueben (2004); Card, Mas, and Rothstein (2008); Cutler, Glaeser, and
Vigdor (1999); Gabriel and Rosenthal (1989)) but fewer studies of the impacts of residential desegregation
policies (Banhardt, 2009; Boisjoly, Duncan, Kremer, Levy, and Eccles, 2006; Edin, Fredriksson, and Åslund,
2003; Rosenbaum, 1995). Edin, Fredriksson, and Åslund (2003) focuses on the redistributive benefits of a
refugee placement policy in Sweden for refugees.
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limit (constrained) versus blocks below the quota limit (unconstrained). By restricting
the choices of whom non-segregated sellers and segregated buyers can transact with, the
model shows that these choice restrictions on the demand- and supply-side can lead to
differences in transaction outcomes for constrained blocks versus unconstrained blocks.
The model has two important features: buyers have segregation preferences5 and hous-
ing markets are thin because housing attributes are heterogeneous along many dimensions
(Arnott, 1989). Therefore, a housing unit in a given location with a vector of attributes
could have few (or no) units sharing similar attributes. Because of segregation prefer-
ences, segregated buyers are willing-to-pay (WTP) more than non-segregated buyers to
live in constrained blocks. So, non-segregated sellers who cannot sell to segregated buyers
have to accept a lower price to attract non-segregated buyers. Because housing markets are
thin, segregated buyers who can only buy from segregated sellers of constrained blocks,
may be WTP a higher price to live in constrained blocks if their most preferred unit is in
the constrained block, their second most preferred choice is in an unconstrained block and
the two choices are imperfect substitutes.
In the paper, I show that under certain assumptions, the model predicts the following
price and quantity effects. First, on average, prices will be higher for Chinese-constrained
blocks versus comparable unconstrained blocks, but prices will be lower for Malay- and
Indian-constrained blocks. Second, fewer units will be sold in constrained blocks versus
comparable unconstrained blocks. The model also highlights two mechanisms that have
opposite price effects (segregation preferences versus thin markets).
I test these predictions on prices and quantities using data on two transaction outcomes,
prices and the proportion of units in an apartment block that was sold during my sample
period. The main identification challenge is that whether a quota binds or not is correlated
with unobserved housing quality. To circumvent the problem that quota-constrained and
quota-unconstrained locations are not comparable, my strategy is to identify kinks in the
outcome variable that coincide with kinks in the policy rule while controlling flexibly for
ethnic proportions. The identification strategy is similar in spirit to the regression kink
design (RKD).6
This research design requires many observations above and below the quota limits.
5Buyers have segregation preferences if they are willing-to-pay more to live in areas with a high propor-
tion of own-ethnic-group members.
6For example, see Card, Lee, and Pei (2009)’s study on the impact of previous earnings (an endogenous
running variable) on unemployment insurance benefits. Other examples include Saez (2010); Chetty et al.
(2011). While the setup is very similar to regression discontinuity design (Angrist and Lavy, 1999; Hahn,
Todd, and van der Klaauw, 2001), it does not fit within a standard regression discontinuity design (RDD)
framework (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010) because the running variable of interest
(ethnic proportions) is endogenous. To implement RDD, I would need pre-policy data on ethnic proportions.
Unfortunately, I was not able to obtain it.
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However, many desegregation policies impose strict upper limits so that few or no housing
areas are above these limits.7 By contrast, when the quota policy was implemented in
Singapore in 1989, the Housing Development Board (HDB) did not want to evict owners
in apartment blocks that were quota-constrained and they also wanted to minimize the
number of households that would be affected. Therefore, they allowed all transactions
that involved buyers and sellers of the same ethnicity because these transactions did not
make housing areas more segregated. One benefit of analyzing housing transactions in my
context is that there are many transactions both below and above the limits.8
This empirical strategy also needs data on the running variable used to determine the
quota status. For the ethnic quotas in Singapore, the running variable of interest would
be the ethnic proportions at the apartment block level. Since many of these policies are
highly contentious, it is often hard to find public data of the running variable or even
public data of the quota limits.9 I circumvent these data issues by hand-matching more
than 500,000 names to ethnicities using the Singapore Residential Phonebook. This allows
me to calculate ethnic proportions for more than 8000 apartment blocks. I combined this
data with outcomes for more than 35,000 housing transactions that I downloaded from
the HDB website. While I do not have administrative data used by HDB to determine
the quota status of each block, I show in the paper that my proxy calculated using the
phonebook is a valid measure of ethnic proportions.
An important identification assumption is that individuals cannot “precisely sort” around
the quota limits so that variation in the treatment status around the policy limit is “as good
as randomized” (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). I test for discontinuities in the density of the
running variable and do not find evidence of sorting using Chinese and Indian proportions
(McCrary, 2008). For Malays, the sorting pattern is not consistent with households trying
7For example, the VAMBAY housing program in Andhra Pradesh in India limit public housing clusters
to be 75% Hindus and 25% Muslims. This means that clusters with more than 75% Hindus are unlikely to
exist. Other countries, such as Germany and Denmark, also have strict quota limits.
8Bertrand, Hanna, and Mullainathan (2010) administered a survey to study the effect of affirmative action
quotas in an Indian engineering college but “the strenuous data requirements of the regression discontinu-
ity design methods coupled with (their) limited sample size reduced (their) ability to provide conclusive
evidence on the returns to attending engineering school for the marginal admit” (p28).
9For example, McCrary (2007) estimates the impact of racial hiring quotas in municipal police depart-
ments in the United States using event study analysis because “information on quotas is much more poorly
measured than whether a city was litigated, and the date the litigation began” (p349). Chay and Fairlie
(1998) report that it is hard to identify the dates of adoption of a particular affirmative action program.
Bertrand, Hanna, and Mullainathan (2010) point out the lack of datasets that comprise both the favored
group who were admitted and the non-favored group who were not admitted due to affirmative action quotas
in colleges. Marion (2009) studies the impact of procurement policies favoring disadvantage business enter-
prises but lacks data on which firms are owned by minorities. In a separate study, Marion (2011) looks at a
subsample where he has data on minority ownership, but a weaker identification strategy.
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to manipulate treatment assignment. I return to this in the results section.
My estimates show price effects that are comparable to the literature on diversity-
enhancing policies and larger quantity effects. On average, transaction prices of Chinese-
constrained units are 5% higher than observably comparable unconstrained blocks. The
average prices are 3% lower for Malay- and Indian-constrained blocks.10 Additionally, I
find that units in constrained blocks tend to be harder to sell. These effects are econom-
ically significant, translating into units being on the market 1 to 1.4 months longer (the
median duration in this market is two months).11 I show that the results above cannot be
fully explained by selection.
These estimated differences in prices and quantities between constrained and uncon-
strained blocks are consistent with my model. They suggest that choice distortions due
to demand- and supply-side choice restrictions are significant, leading to differences in
transaction outcomes. Further, I use the opposite price effects predicted in the model to
disentangle the two mechanisms discussed above. I find evidence that segregation prefer-
ences are important for all three quotas. This suggests location preferences are inelastic
because of segregation preferences. I also find support for supply-side constraints and thin
markets for the Chinese quotas.
Together, these estimated policy effects on prices and quantities of sold housing units
imply that transaction values of constrained blocks are 13% to 27% lower than the trans-
action values of comparable unconstrained blocks. My calculations suggest that more than
80% of the impact on transaction values is due to reductions in the quantity domain. Un-
derstanding these effects on transaction values is important because the ease of sale affects
household mobility, housing transactions have spillover effects on the broader economy
and housing transaction taxes are an important source of tax revenue.12
10Marion (2009) finds that removal of preference policies for minority-owned businesses led to 5.6%
lower prices for state-funded government procurement, relative to the comparison group. Matsa and Miller
(2013) find that gender quotas in Norwegian corporate boards had no effect on most corporate decisions but
increased labor costs by 4.1% (as a share of assets) relative to control firms that were not affected by the
quotas. The price effects are smaller, but of the same order of magnitude than price effects of other housing
regulations. Autor, Palmer, and Pathak (2012) find that transaction prices for former rent controlled units
increased by 6% to 8% following the removal of rent control in Cambridge. Wang (2011) finds a net increase
in the equilibrium price of housing of 7.5%, following the privatization of state-owned housing in China.
11Marion (2009) finds that the removal of affirmative action policies on state-funded procurement con-
tracts did not affect the average number of bidders. Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011) report that preferential
treatment towards small firms in highway procurement bids lead to small changes in overall participation
(approximately 1%) but large heterogeneity on participation effects for small bidders (the favored group)
versus large bidders.
12See, for example, Ferreira, Gyourko, and Tracy (2010); Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013); Mian and Sufi
(2011). Housing transaction taxes account for 10% of tax revenue in Singapore in 2012 (Inland Revenue
Authority of Singapore, 2013).
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These results point to distortionary effects from imposing quantity restrictions. An
important lesson is that diversity-enhancing policies can exacerbate existing frictions, es-
pecially in the housing market. This contrasts against a literature on second-best choices
suggesting distortions from diversity policies could offset existing imperfections in the
market, leading to efficiency gains.13 It is exactly because the housing market is thin,
there are already few transactions relative to the housing stock. Restricting non-segregated
sellers from transacting with segregated buyers could exacerbate, rather than mitigate this
problem, leading to even fewer units being sold for constrained blocks.
My findings have policy implications beyond Singapore. Many countries have resi-
dential desegregation programs, and some include quota limits.14 These results suggest
it might take a long time to achieve desegregation goals. The fact that many blocks
are still above the quota limits sixteen years after the policy was introduced, and that
there are still meaningful differences in transaction outcomes between constrained and un-
constrained blocks suggest the combination of inelastic preferences and thin markets is
important, presenting challenges to achieve desegregation. In a separate paper that uses
quasi-experimental variation from the quota policy to structurally estimate preferences and
simulate the first best allocation of ethnic groups to neighborhoods, Wong (2013) finds that
sixteen years after the policy, only 30% of neighborhoods are within one standard devia-
tion of the first best allocation.
One caveat of the analysis is that I do not have pre-policy data so, I cannot simu-
late a counterfactual of no policy. My identification strategy compares transactions for
constrained versus unconstrained blocks, holding the supply of housing units and the dis-
tribution of preferences fixed at the post-policy equilibrium. In the paper, I discuss pos-
sible confounders due to general equilibrium adjustments and show that they cannot fully
explain my results. Moreover, the preceding discussion shows that finding meaningful
differences in transaction outcomes for constrained versus unconstrained blocks so many
years later is important.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I provide some back-
ground on Singapore and the ethnic quotas. I describe the data in Section 3, provide a
theoretical and empirical framework in Sections 4 and 5, discuss results in Section 6 and
13See Holzer and Neumark (2000) for a review. See Corns and Schotter (1999) and McAfee and McMillan
(1989) for examples of efficiency gains due to diversity-enhancing policies that encourage more competition
in a setting with imperfect competition. Another example is affirmative action hiring and admission policies
offsetting problems due to statistical discrimination and imperfect information.
14For example, there are religion-based quotas in a housing program in Andhra Pradesh in India, settle-
ment policies in Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark and Israel have restrictions on where
newly arrived immigrants can settle to reduce immigrant concentration (Scott, 2006; Banhardt, 2009; Dutch
Refugee Council, 1999). There are also many “integration maintenance programs” or “neighborhood stabi-
lization programs”. See Polikoff (1986) and Boustan (2011) for an overview.
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conclude in Section 7.
2 Background
Singapore is a multi-ethnic country with a population of 4.5 million (Singapore Depart-
ment of Statistics, 2006). The three major ethnic groups are the Chinese (77%), the
Malays (14%) and the Indians (8%). The Chinese have the highest median monthly in-
come (S$2335), followed by the Indians (S$2167) and the Malays (S$1790). Although the
median Malay household is poorest, the income distribution of the Indians have a longer
left tail (more Indians are very poor). Also, the ownership rate in public housing is the
lowest amongst the Indians.
Public housing is the most popular choice of housing in Singapore with 82% of the res-
ident population living in public housing (Housing Development Board, 2006). The units
are built and managed by the Housing Development Board (HDB). Public housing was
first built in Singapore in 1960 to solve the young nation’s housing crisis (Parliamentary
Debates, 1989).
There are three ways Singapore residents can live in an HDB unit. They may apply
through the primary allocation system for new HDB units,15 they may purchase existing
HDB units in the resale market or they may rent. The rental market is negligible (98%
percent of the HDB units are owner-occupied) because rentals are regulated to ensure that
public housing is used for primary residences only (Housing Development Board, 2006).16
This paper focuses on the resale market only.
Public housing in Singapore is based on the concept of new towns: self-contained,
large scale satellite housing developments that usually includes public housing units, a
town center and a range of amenities. HDB dwellings are relatively uniform. To cater to
the different needs of households, HDB designed and built 8 unit types. Type 1 is a studio,
Type 2 is a 1-bedroom unit, Type 3 is a 2-bedroom unit. Types 4 to 6 all have 3 bedrooms,
but the higher types have extra living and/or dining areas. The remainder 2 types are called
15All eligible Singapore citizens can apply to buy new HDB units in the primary market. To be eligible,
the applicant must be married, aged 21 and above and have gross income below a ceiling determined by
HDB for that year. The primary market comprises mostly new HDB units that are built-to-order in new
HDB estates. Most applicants are first time buyers because applicants must not have interest in any other
property within 30 months of the application. Applicants can submit a request for one of the 8 HDB types
of units and also a preference for one of the 3 HDB zones (North, North East and West). A computer ballot
will determine the applicants’ queue position to book a unit. Lottery winners are given 3 months to select a
new unit. They will typically wait 2 to 3 years before the unit is completed in the new HDB estate. After 5
years, the owners are free to sell their units in the resale market.
16In my sample period, owners of public housing are only allowed to rent if they can prove that they need
to be out of the country for an extended period.
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HUDC and multi-generation units. These tend to be larger units but HDB built very few
of them. The most popular units are type 3 to 6. Apart from the number of rooms, the
layout and size in public housing units are relatively homogeneous.
To understand the ethnic quotas, it is important to understand the geography of housing
markets in Singapore. The smallest spatial unit is an HDB unit. An HDB block is a multi-
storeyed apartment block with an average of 74 households. HDB neighborhoods are
clusters of HDB blocks. The average neighborhood in Singapore has 4000 households,
45 HDB blocks and an average land area of 1.5 square miles. Due to the high population
density in Singapore, a neighborhood is comparable to a US Census block group by land
area but it is comparable to a US Census tract by population size. HDB towns are clusters
of HDB neighborhoods.
Figure 1 shows a map of an HDB community with HDB blocks and HDB neigh-
borhoods. HDB blocks and neighborhoods are terms used by HDB to describe clusters
of public housing units. Throughout the paper, blocks and neighborhoods refer to HDB
blocks and HDB neighborhoods. Each number in the map corresponds to an HDB block.
Notice that the block numbers range from 100 to 600. There are 4 HDB neighborhoods in
the map. All blocks that range from 100 to 199 belong to neighborhood 1 and all blocks
from 200 to 299 are in neighborhood 2 and neighborhoods 4 and 5 are defined similarly.
HDB neighborhoods are clusters of HDB blocks that are spatially contained, and separated
from other HDB neighborhoods and other private housing by main roads. All HDB blocks
and neighborhoods include public housing units only. There are no private housing units
in this map.
Ethnic Integration Policy
In late 1988 and early 1989, the government began to sound alarms about the growing
“concentrations of racial groups” and the “gravity of this problem”. They were concerned
about going back to “the pre-1965 period when conditions bred distrust and misunder-
standing among the various races and when there were even racial riots”. The Minister for
National Development pointed out as an example that in the town of Bedok, “if present
trends continue, the proportion of Malays will reach 30% by 1991, and will exceed 40% in
10 years’ time”. He was also concerned that “once a critical point is passed, racial group-
ings accelerate suddenly”. In response to these trends, the government announced the
Ethnic Integration Policy in a parliamentary debate on February 16, 1989 and the policy
was implemented starting March 1, 1989 (Parliamentary Debates, 1989).
The policy is a set of quota limits at the block and neighborhood level. Table 1 lists
the limits, in comparison to the 2000 national ethnic proportions. There are block level
and neighborhood level limits. They chose the HDB neighborhood as the basic unit to
apply the quota because “the neighborhood is a distinct entity with a well-defined physical
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boundary”. Quota limits were set depending on the rate of formation of new households
as well as recent trends in applications. At that time, applications for HDB units did not
reflect the ethnic composition in Singapore. Chinese, Malays and Indians accounted for
74%, 19% and 7% respectively. The neighborhood limits allow some flexibility relative
to these proportions. The Chinese neighborhood limit was set at 84% (10% more than
the share of Chinese applications), and the Malay and Indian neighborhood limits were
3% above these proportions (22% and 10% respectively). Block quotas were 3% above
each neighborhood limit to allow some blocks to be more segregated relative to the neigh-
borhood limit. It was important to the government to have specific limits that would be
applied to “all the ethnic groups in all areas”. They reasoned that giving a range would
mean that “the limit will vary from place to place and this can give rise to a lot of suspicion
and misunderstanding”. Since then, the quota limits have been fixed over time and are also
fixed for all areas (Parliamentary Debates, 1989).
The quotas are limits on ethnic proportions that determine which HDB communities
are segregated (as defined by these limits). Specifically, the block and neighborhood quota
limits determine which ethnic group is “segregated” in an HDB block and neighborhood,
respectively. For example, Table 1 shows that the Chinese neighborhood- and block-level
quota limits are 84% and 87% respectively. If the block level proportion of Chinese is
above 87%, the Chinese are “segregated” for that block. If the neighborhood level propor-
tion of Chinese is above 84%, the Chinese are the segregated group for all blocks in that
neighborhood. An HDB unit can be constrained if its block or its neighborhood is above
the respective quota limits.
For blocks and neighborhoods above the quota limits, the policy rule is to ban all
transactions that make already segregated blocks and neighborhoods from becoming more
segregated. Specifically, sellers from the non-segregated group cannot sell to buyers from
the segregated group because this increases the ethnic proportion of the segregated group
farther above the limit.17 However, transactions involving buyers and sellers from the same
ethnicity will always be allowed because this does not increase the ethnic proportion.
The policy restrictions were designed to avoid extremely segregated outcomes without
affecting too many households. For example, it was emphasized many times in the par-
liamentary debate that “no HDB owner, whether he is Chinese, Malay or Indian will be
requested to move from his present flat”. Resale statistics at that time showed that most
HDB owners who sold their flats sold to buyers of the same ethnic group. Since, the policy
was designed to allow all transactions involving buyers and sellers of the same ethnicity,
17These restrictions are easily enforced because the identity cards of all Singaporeans report their eth-
nicity. Also, all resale transactions have to be approved by the HDB. One of the approval steps involves
checking whether the transaction violates the ethnic housing quotas. An inter-ethnic married couple can
choose to use either ethnicities of the spouses.
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they estimated that fewer than 1700 owners would be potentially affected by the policy.
The government also did not anticipate great price effects and reasoned that “it is a small
price we must be prepared to pay in order to ensure that we do build a cohesive, better
integrated society in Singapore” (Parliamentary Debates, 1989).
The policy appears to have reduced the Malay and Indian proportions in some places.
For example, Lum and Tien (2003) report that the town of Bedok and Yishun had 59% and
24% Malays and Indians in 1988 but only 19% and 11% respectively by 1998. The third
town they looked at, Redhill, started with 87% Chinese before the policy and still had 84%
Chinese by 1998. There have been calls to relax the restrictions of the quota, especially
when the “volume of transactions is actually very low and therefore the ability to sell the
flat to the right ethnic group would be more difficult”. There were also complaints that the
policy “is posing a serious financial problem to some families” (Parliamentary Debates,
2003).
In spite of these complaints, the government has repeatedly insisted on maintaining the
quota limits. In fact, the policy was even extended to non-Malaysian permanent residents.
Beginning in March 2010, HDB began to enforce neighborhood and block quota limits
(5% and 8% respectively) on the share of non-Malaysian permanent residents. Malaysian
permanent residents are not subject to the quota due to their close cultural and historical
similarities with Singaporeans (both countries are former British colonies and Singapore
was part of Malaysia for a short period in the 1960s).
Residential desegregation is also not unique to Singapore, including the use of quotas
(see Footnote 14 for more examples). In Europe, many settlement policies place limits on
where newly arrived immigrants can settle, mostly in an effort to avoid the formation of
enclaves. For example, in Germany and Denmark, this is achieved by placing limits on the
number of refugees each municipality is obliged to provide dwellings for (Dutch Refugee
Council, 1999; Glitz, 2012).
3 Data
Table 2 lists the summary statistics of the full dataset. The analysis only focuses on the
public housing market which represents 82% of the citizens and permanent residents in
Singapore. There are 8,007 blocks and 35,744 resale transactions. The Data Appendix
includes more details on how the sample was created.
Ethnic proportions
The hardest data to obtain was the ethnic composition at the apartment block level be-
cause data on ethnic proportions at a fine geographic level are often not publicly available.
To calculate ethnic proportions, I hand matched more than 500,000 names to ethnicities
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using the 2005 Singapore Residential Phonebook. It was published on April 1st 2005.
Households can request for phone and address records to be unlisted at a charge of $20
per annum plus a one-time administrative fee of $20. One concern is that higher income
groups are more likely to opt out. The sample size of the phonebook suggests that a ma-
jority of Singapore residents did not opt to be unlisted. The ethnic proportions calculated
using the phonebook data are also similar to the national ethnic proportions, I did not de-
tect a dramatically lower Chinese proportion (if higher income groups are more likely to be
unlisted, then, I should find fewer Chinese names in the phonebook since the Chinese are
the higher income group). Higher income groups are more likely to be in private housing
rather than public housing and it is unlikely that this omitted household characteristic is
different for constrained and unconstrained units. These suggest that any selection effects
due to phone listing behavior is likely to be small and not different by ethnic groups.
There are 549,133 listings that correspond to HDB blocks in the Ethnic Integration
Policy. I was able to match 548,024 names to ethnicities (a 99.8% match) using differences
in the structure of Chinese, Malay and Indian names. For example, most Chinese names
only have 2 or 3 words; Malay names are primarily Muslim names since 99% of Malays
in Singapore are Muslims (Singapore Department of Statistics, 2000); Indian names are
matched according to popular first and last names. Nevertheless, 1,109 names remain
unmatched. Three listings were firms and 819 listings had names that only included initials
or first names only and 287 listings had names with unidentifiable ethnicities (usually
because I could not determine whether the names were Indian or Malay names). I dropped
these unmatched names when constructing ethnic proportions (ie. the percent of Chinese
in a block is calculated as the number of names matched as Chinese divided by the number
of names in the block that were matched to Chinese, Malay or Indian). I also tried not
dropping these 1,109 names and the results are similar.
The match between names and ethnicity is likely to be most accurate for Chinese
names because of distinct last names.18 On the other hand, Indian and Malay propor-
tions may be more prone to measurement error because many Indian Muslims adopt Ara-
bic names that are very similar to Malay names. Of the matched listings, 459,192 were
matched using popular first and last names. Many Chinese names were matched this way.
84% of these names were identified as Chinese names, 13% were Malay names and 3%
were Indian names. Another 88,832 names were matched individually. 50% of these
names were identified as Chinese names, 17% as Malay names and 34% as Indian names.
Overall, the ethnic proportions calculated using the phonebook were 78% Chinese, 14%
Malay and 8% Indian, very close to the national proportions reported in the 2000 Census
(77% Chinese, 14% Malay and 8% Indian).
18Even Chinese Muslims would tend to keep their Chinese last names.
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Proportion of unit types
I purchased a non-public dataset from HDB that is the census of all HDB blocks in
Singapore. The dataset includes the number of each of the eight unit types in each block,
the street address and the HDB town. I use this dataset to create eight measures of the
stock of HDB supply, measured as the proportion of units in an HDB block that is of each
of the eight types.
Resale transactions
Every three months, HDB would upload resale transaction data for the past three
months on their website. They publish data on the type of unit sold, the square footage of
the apartment unit, the year the HDB block was built, which floor range the unit is in (eg.
between floors one and five, floors six and ten), price and month of sale, street address and
block number. I calculate the age of the HDB block as 2006 minus the year it was built.
The final sample includes 35,744 transactions between April 2005 and August 2006.
Quota status
Each month, HDB publishes the quota status of all the HDB blocks in the Ethnic In-
tegration Policy on their website. I downloaded these quota dummies every month from
March 2005 to July 2006. In total, I have 133,378 block-months. The website only in-
dicates whether an HDB block is constrained but does not specify whether it is because
the block or neighborhood quota limit was constrained in that month. If all blocks in a
neighborhood are constrained, I know the neighborhood limit is binding.19 The quota data
was missing for 117 block-months. See the Data Appendix for details on how I filled in
the data for these 117 observations.
I matched the quota status of the previous month to each transaction so that the quota
status of block b in November 2005 is matched to the transaction price for units in the
same block in December 2005.20
Stayers and movers
I do not have data on seller ethnicity, but I do collect data on the ethnicity of stayers
and movers in an HDB block by matching names and postal codes using the 2005 and
2006 phonebooks. Each phonebook includes six-digit postal codes that uniquely identify
an HDB block. I am not able to identify addresses within an HDB block. I define stayers
as households living in the same postal codes in 2005 and 2006. Movers are households
who changed their postal code from 2005 to 2006. Entrants are phonebook listings that
only appeared in the 2006 phonebook only. I provide more details in Section 2 in the data
appendix.
19Neighborhoods are identified using the first two digits and the fourth digit of the postal code obtained
in the phonebook.
20I repeated the analysis with a 3-month lag, instead of a 1-month lag and the main results are similar.
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4 Conceptual framework
My empirical analysis compares transactions in constrained and unconstrained blocks.
This section lays out a theoretical framework to deliver testable predictions for two trans-
action outcomes: number of sold units (quantity) and prices. I focus on describing treat-
ment effects for the Chinese block quota limits only. The effects for the other quotas are
similar.
I use a static, discrete choice framework with heterogeneous households choosing het-
erogeneous HDB units.21 Each HDB unit i is a bundle of attributes, Xi, including the
number of rooms, paint color, amenities and price (Pi).
Demand is driven by households who have heterogeneous preferences over these at-
tributes. There are two types of households: Chinese (C) and non-Chinese (NC). Each
household h from ethnic group g chooses an HDB unit i to maximize his indirect utility:
V hg = maxiV (Xi,Pi;β hg,yhg,εhgi ) (1)
where εhgi is an idiosyncratic taste shock, y
hg is income and β hg is a taste parameter that
indexes the household’s preference over housing attributes, drawn from two distributions,
FC and FNC, for the Chinese and the non-Chinese respectively. The outside option for
each household is not moving. Households have segregation preferences so that Chinese
prefer to live in Chinese communities where there are more Chinese neighbors and more
amenities and attributes preferred by Chinese.22 Non-Chinese prefer to live in non-Chinese
communities.
The supply of HDB units is fixed. Sellers have an outside option of not moving, which
determines their reservation value. Sellers are profit-maximizers where the profit is the
transaction price minus the cost of selling (which includes agent fees, transaction taxes
and other costs). Every owner of an HDB unit is a potential seller who will sell if the price
for his unit, net of cost, is above his reservation value.
Housing markets are thin because housing attributes are heterogeneous along many
dimensions (Arnott, 1989). Therefore, a housing unit in a given location with a vector of
21There is a large literature on sorting in housing markets (eg. Tiebout (1956), Benabou (1993) and Epple
and Sieg (1997)). Location choice models that use a discrete choice framework builds on McFadden (1973,
1978), Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995). For examples of discrete choice models in the
urban economics literature, see Quigley (1985), Nechyba and Strauss (1998), Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan
(2007) and Wong (2013).
22Examples of ethnic-specific amenities include kindergartens that teach ethnic languages, places of wor-
ship, community centers that set aside space for cultural events and activities for different ethnic groups (eg.
Tai-chi for Chinese, sepak takraw courts for Malays and cricket fields for Indians). In a qualitative study of
ethnic relations, Singaporeans indicated a preference for “special ethnic community places”, suggesting that
ethnic based taste for amenities could be important (Lai, 1995).
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attributes could have few (or no) units sharing similar attributes. Thin asset markets are
often characterized by having few transactions relative to the stock.23
In equilibrium, buyers and sellers are optimizing and have no incentive to deviate from
their choices. All buyers are utility-maximizing, given their preferences and the set of
housing units in the market. All sellers are profit-maximizing. Now that I have described
the demand- and supply-sides and the equilibrium concept, we are ready to analyze the
treatment effects.
My approach is to consider the different types of transactions, motivated by the ethnic-
based restrictions of the policy. Given the two ethnic groups, and the fact that each trans-
action involves a buyer and a seller, there are four types of transactions:
• Type 1: The seller is non-Chinese and the buyer is Chinese (banned for blocks with
more than 87% Chinese)
• Type 2: The seller is non-Chinese and the buyer is non-Chinese
• Type 3: The seller is Chinese and the buyer is non-Chinese
• Type 4: The seller is Chinese and the buyer is Chinese
Empirical predictions
The thought experiment is to compare HDB resale transactions for constrained blocks
with 88% Chinese against transactions of units in unconstrained blocks with 86% Chi-
nese.24 Because of segregation preferences, the Chinese are willing-to-pay (WTP) more
for units in the 86% and 88% blocks than the non-Chinese.
The key intuition is that the choice restrictions of the policy act as limits to arbitrage.
If banned and allowed choices are different, the rules prevent restricted buyers and sell-
ers of the constrained blocks from arbitraging away these differences for the constrained
block. In equilibrium, with heterogeneous choices, prices and quantities will differ for
constrained blocks (with arbitrage limits) versus unconstrained blocks (no arbitrage lim-
its). Whether these arbitrage limits will lead to differences in transaction outcomes de-
pends on how much heterogeneity exists (how different are restricted and unrestricted
buyers’ WTP; how different are units owned by restricted versus unrestricted sellers).
23For Singapore, Tu and Wong (2002) report that the volume of annual transactions in the resale market
is 5% of the public housing stock. In a study of trading frictions in the market for aircrafts, Gavazza (2011),
reports that only 5.8% of the total stock of aircrafts in his sample traded within 12 months.
24The empirical implementation deviates from this ideal thought experiment in several ways, due to data
limitations (I do not observe the ethnic proportions HDB uses to implement the policy) and sample size
issues (there are too few blocks with only 88% and 86% Chinese). I abstract from these issues for the
moment and return to them when I discuss empirics.
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Without heterogeneity, there is nothing to arbitrage away in the first place. If banned and
allowed choices are different, then, limits to arbitrage imposed on transactions for con-
strained blocks will translate into differences in transaction outcomes between constrained
and unconstrained blocks.
The empirical predictions below show how we can use transaction outcomes to in-
vestigate the distortionary effects of the policy’s restrictions. The idea is that the pol-
icy restricts choices, if choices are heterogeneous and arbitrage limits are imposed on
constrained blocks, transaction outcomes will differ across constrained and unconstrained
blocks. These policy-induced choice distortions are costly because restricted buyers and
sellers are forced to imperfectly substitute from banned choices to allowed choices. The
“imperfectness” of the substitutability will depend on how heterogeneous choices are.
There are two types of choice restrictions. First, non-segregated sellers are facing
demand-side choice restrictions because they cannot sell to segregated buyers. These
demand-side choice restrictions affect transaction outcomes because of segregation prefer-
ences amongst buyers (segregated buyers and non-segregated buyers have different WTP).
Second, segregated buyers are facing supply-side choice restrictions because they cannot
buy from non-segregated sellers of constrained blocks. Supply-side choice restrictions
could affect transaction outcomes if housing markets are thin, so that the choice restric-
tions could matter on the margin when there are few (or no) choices with similar attributes.
The model highlights these two mechanisms: (i) demand-side choice restrictions and seg-
regation preferences versus (ii) supply-side choice restrictions and thin markets.
In my notation below, I use a superscript to denote the transaction type and a subscript
to denote the block. Prices could differ by type for the 88% block because of the ethnic-
based restrictions of the policy. For example, P288 is the price for type 2 transactions in
the 88% block. I assume there are no limits to arbitrage in the 86% block because it is
unconstrained, so, there is only one price (P86). I develop five predictions on transaction
outcomes that inform the empirical analysis later. I summarize these in Table 3.
E1: Prices for type 2 trades will be weakly lower in the constrained block than prices
for the unconstrained block, P288 ≤ P86
Non-Chinese sellers in the 88% blocks cannot sell to Chinese buyers. So, they have
to accept lower transaction prices, in order to attract non-Chinese buyers who would not
have bought into the 88% blocks otherwise. This is an example of demand-side choice
restrictions leading to lower prices because of segregation preferences.
Whether this is a strict or a weak inequality will depend on how segregated preferences
are (how different the WTP distributions are). If the marginal non-Chinese buyer for the
88% block has a strictly lower WTP than the marginal buyer for the 86% block, then,
P288 < P86. Since I did not place many restrictions on the distributions of WTP, the Chinese
and non-Chinese WTP distributions could overlap significantly, so it is possible that P288 =
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P86 (though segregation preferences makes this unlikely).




Non-Chinese buyers of the 88% blocks are unrestricted, they can buy from both Chi-
nese and non-Chinese sellers. Therefore, any price differences between type 2 and type
3 trades will be arbitraged away because there are no restrictions from the policy to limit
non-Chinese buyers from arbitraging price differences across Chinese and non-Chinese
sellers.
E3: Prices for type 4 trades will be weakly higher in the constrained block, P488 ≥ P86
Chinese buyers cannot buy from non-Chinese sellers of the 88% blocks. If markets
are thin, there could be a wedge in the willingness-to-pay between the marginal Chinese
buyer’s most preferred unit (that happens to be in the 88% block) and the second most
preferred unit (that happens to be in the 86% block). This is an example of supply-side
choice restrictions leading to higher prices because of thin markets.
Intuitively, Chinese buyers who cannot buy from non-Chinese sellers in the 88% blocks
are facing a supply-side constraint (they cannot buy 12% of the units in the 88% block).
If markets are thick, this restriction should not have price effects because substitutes are
available for the Chinese buyers. If markets are thin, this supply-side choice restriction
could lead to higher prices.25 This price difference depends on how heterogeneous supply
is. Specifically, it depends on the marginal Chinese buyer’s elasticity of substitutability
between units Chinese buyers cannot buy and other units Chinese buyers are allowed to
buy.
At this point, it is useful to make two observations. First, demand-side choice restric-
tions on which buyers restricted sellers can sell to lead to lower prices for these sellers
because of segregation preferences. Conversely, supply-side choice restrictions on which
sellers restricted buyers can buy from lead to higher prices for these buyers because of
thin markets. These opposite effects on prices mean that, on average, the price differences
between constrained and unconstrained blocks are theoretically inconclusive. Importantly,
the opposite price effects of the two mechanisms (demand-side constraints due to segrega-
tion preferences (E1) versus supply-side constraints due to thin markets (E3)) allow me to
disentangle them, as I explain in the results section.
Second, there are at most two equilibrium prices for the 88% blocks and the main
margin whereby these two prices differ is by buyer ethnicity. This is because, for the three
25On average, 11% of HDB blocks are Chinese-constrained and at most 13% of these units are owned
by non-Chinese. This seems like a fairly small reduction in the stock but is potentially significant when
compared to the share of the stock that trades annually (5% according to Tu and Wong (2002)).
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types of trades allowed for the 88% block, once we condition on buyer ethnicity, seller
ethnicity only varies between type 2 and type 3 trades and prices for these two types of
trades are the same (E2).26 In other words, conditional on buyer ethnicity, if E2 holds,
prices should not differ by seller ethnicity (P288 = P
3
88). Therefore, we can denote the two
equilibrium prices for the 88% blocks as PC88 to represent prices paid by Chinese buyers
(type 4 trades) and PNC88 to represent prices paid by non-Chinese buyers (type 2 and type
3 trades). This simplifies the analysis for average prices and also informs further tests
discussed in the results section.
Now that we have discussed the predictions on prices, conditional on knowing buyer
and seller ethnicity, we are ready to discuss predictions for the two main outcomes: aver-
age prices and the number of units sold.
E4: Average prices will be weakly higher in the Chinese-constrained block, P¯88 ≥ P86
(it will be weakly lower for Malay- and Indian-constrained blocks)
The average price for the 88% block will depend on the shares of each transaction
type, stb. Equation (2) is essentially a weighted average of negative price differences due
to demand-side constraints (E1 and E2) and positive price differences due to supply-side
constraints (E3). Therefore,
P¯88−P86 = ((s288 + s388)∗PNC88 + s488PC88)−P86
= (s288 + s
3
88)∗ (PNC88 −P86)+ s488 ∗ (PC88−P86)
(2)
The overall effect on the difference in average prices depends on the transaction shares
and the magnitudes of these opposite price differences.
We can bound these transaction shares. Since type 2 transactions are the only trans-
actions involving non-Chinese sellers for the 88% block, we know that s288 is bounded
above by 12%. Since PNC88 ≤ PC88, Chinese sellers would prefer to sell to Chinese buyers
than non-Chinese buyers. So, s488 ≥ s388. Therefore, it is likely that type 4 trades are the
majority of the transactions for the 88% blocks. If magnitudes of price differences are not
too different, then, the net effect on average prices is heavily weighted towards a positive
effect on average prices because the Chinese are the majority buyers.
Notice that the opposite is true for Malay and Indian quotas. The main point is that
the Chinese are the overwhelming majority of in the country. So, whichever transaction
type that involves them will heavily weight the sign of the average price effect towards
that price difference. For example, if we examine the Malay quota (the block quota limit
is 25%), Chinese buyers are a part of the non-Malay buyers (type 2 and type 3 trades), so
the average price effect is weighted heavily by the negative price effect (PNM26 −P24).
26For non-Chinese buyers, they can buy from both non-Chinese sellers (type 2) and Chinese sellers (type
3); but Chinese buyers can only buy from Chinese sellers (type 4).
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E5: The number of type 2 and type 3 trades are weakly lower and the number of type
4 trades are weakly higher for the constrained blocks
I assume the distribution of sellers’ reservation values is the same for the 86% block
and the 88% block.27 A unit is sold if the transaction price (net of cost) is greater than a
seller’s reservation value. Then, E1 implies that weakly fewer non-Chinese sellers will sell
in the 88% block compared to the 86% block. Similarly, weakly fewer Chinese sellers will
sell to non-Chinese buyers because of E2. By E3, the number of type 4 trades are weakly
higher. The overall effect on the total number of transactions is theoretically inconclusive.
If price effects in E1 are larger than price effects in E3, and price elasticities are similar,
then, the overall effect on the total number of units sold should be lower for constrained
blocks.
In summary, we can investigate the distortionary effects of the policy because choice
restrictions imposed on constrained blocks translate into differences in transaction out-
comes between constrained and unconstrained blocks, as explained in E1 to E5.
Caveats
There are a few caveats to the framework above. A more general model could allow
supply to change but the assumption of fixed supply is appropriate given my sample period
(less than two years).28
An important weakness is I cannot estimate the treatment effect of introducing the
quota policy because I do not have pre-policy data to estimate a counterfactual of no policy.
Therefore, I can only estimate “partial equilibrium” treatment effects in a setting where the
policy has already been introduced. My research design holds fixed the supply of HDB
units and the distribution of buyers and sellers at the post policy equilibrium, and compares
transactions of constrained versus unconstrained blocks.
This analysis ignores general equilibrium effects of the policy. For example, one effect
of the policy is the reduction of very segregated neighborhoods. Therefore, the location
choice sets for households before and after the policy are likely to be different. The current
analysis ignores this adjustment margin because it holds fixed the supply of HDB units.
Another treatment effect outside the scope of this study is the impact of the policy on
27I discuss the impact of the policy on sellers’ reservation values in the results section.
28The supply of new units in the resale market is small during this time frame. New supply in the primary
public housing market is likely to have less impact on prices in the resale market because households who
participate in the primary market typically have to wait two to three years for a unit to be completed in the
primary market. Also, income limits and other eligibility criteria suggest that many households who are
eligible to buy in the resale market are not eligible to buy in the primary market (see Footnote 15 for more
details). So, households who are potential buyers in the resale market are unlikely to be potential buyers in
the primary market.
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changes in preferences towards other ethnic groups. By encouraging households of differ-
ent ethnic groups to mix, these households’ preferences could change over time (Boisjoly
et al., 2006).
While a full general equilibrium analysis such as Epple, Romer, and Sieg (2001) is be-
yond the scope of this paper, I investigate how three long run adjustments in the supply and
demand side might bias my partial equilibrium estimates: endogenous sorting of house-
holds within HDB resale markets, endogenous sorting of households out of resale markets
and endogenous supply of HDB resale units. I discuss these threats to identification in the
results section.
Finally, one would also like to say something about the deadweight loss and incidence
of this policy, again, with the partial equilibrium caveats above. Let me first discuss effects
on total surplus, then, discuss incidence.
There are two sources of deadweight loss due to the policy restrictions, one related
to quantity effects and another due to price effects. The policy bans type 1 trades for the
constrained blocks (non-Chinese sellers cannot sell to Chinese buyers who have higher
WTP). If all non-Chinese sellers who would have sold to Chinese buyers in the counter-
factual (no choice restrictions on constrained blocks) can sell to non-Chinese buyers at
the same price, then, there would be no differences in prices and quantities between con-
strained and unconstrained blocks. However, if we see fewer units sold for constrained
blocks versus unconstrained blocks (my proxy for the counterfactual), this suggests some
trades that have positive surplus that would have occurred absent the policy did not occur
due to the policy restrictions. Second, if we find that prices are lower then, this suggests
allocative inefficiencies because some units are not sold to buyers with the highest WTP.
In other words, there could be inefficiencies because the type 1 trades that are banned by
the policy for constrained blocks either do not occur or are instead substituted by type
2 trades that transact at a lower price (they are sold to non-Chinese buyers with lower
willingness-to-pay).
On incidence, we would expect that sellers of constrained units would bear much of the
burden, especially the non-Chinese sellers because it is likely to be harder to sell (number
of units sold is lower) or conditional on a sale, sell at a lower price. If we see evidence
of price increases, then some Chinese buyers buying Chinese-constrained units might be
hurt also because the quota restriction means they can only buy from Chinese sellers and
market thinnes might lead to premiums for these units.
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5 Empirical Framework
The thought experiment in the theoretical framework compares constrained versus uncon-
strained blocks that are otherwise conceptually identical. My empirical framework op-
erationalizes this thought experiment by comparing transaction outcomes of constrained
versus unconstrained units, restricting the analysis to blocks close to the quota limits, con-
trolling flexibly for polynomials of ethnic proportions (an important attribute that drives
sorting behavior) and a set of observables that can explain much of the outcome variation
in my data. I test for treatment effects of the policy on three sets of outcomes: lnprice,
the type of unit sold and the proportion of units sold. I restrict my analysis to observations
within 10% of the Chinese, Malay and Indian block quota limits respectively. In this sec-
tion, I describe the equations for the Chinese quota. The empirical set up for the Malay
and Indian quotas are similar.
I estimate three sets of equations. The key regressors in the first two equations are
at the block-month level and the key regressor in the final equation is at the block level.
The following two equations use the assignment dummy from the HDB website as the
key independent variable. Equation (3) only controls for smooth functions of the running
variable, while equation (4) controls for other observable characteristics:




φl (percentCbk−0.87)l + εibkt (3)





+Bbk δ + τt +ωk + εibkt (4)
where yibkt is the outcome variable for transaction i in block b, town k and month t;
QCbk,t−1 is a dummy for whether the Chinese quota was binding in the previous month,
(percentCbk−0.87)l are lth order polynomials of the Chinese proportion, centered around
the block quota limit, Bbk includes observables for the HDB block, including the age of the
HDB block and its squared, proportion of units in a block that is of each of the seven HDB
types (type 1 is the omitted group); τt and ωk are month-of-sale and town fixed effects.
The standard errors in (3) are clustered at the block level and standard errors in (4) are
clustered at the town level.29
29I also tried estimating ethnic proportions separately for constrained and unconstrained blocks. The
coefficient estimates are similar but not significant for some specifications when standard errors are clustered.
I report the estimates using separate polynomials in the appendix.
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The key parameter of interest is β , the difference in outcomes between observably
comparable transactions in constrained versus unconstrained blocks. As discussed in E4
in the previous section, if the outcome is price, I expect β to be positive for Chinese quotas
and negative for Malay and Indian quotas.
The main challenge in interpreting β as the treatment effect of the policy is omitted
variables. For example, the price of constrained units could be higher than the price of un-
constrained units (even if the true β is zero) because areas with more unobserved Chinese
amenities tend to attract more Chinese, so, are more likely to be Chinese-constrained and
more expensive (the quota dummy is correlated with unobserved housing quality). Be-
low, I test this identification assumption and argue that selection on unobservables cannot
explain my treatment effect estimates.
The final equation is estimated at the block level because the outcome (the proportion
of units in a block that is sold in the sample period) does not vary across time:




φl percentClbk +Bbk δ +ωk + εbk (5)
where percent QCbk is the proportion of months the Chinese quota is binding in the sample
period. Here, β estimates the impact of a percentage point increase in the proportion of
months the quota is binding on the proportion of units in a block that is sold within the
sample period. As discussed in E5, I expect β to be negative. Here, the treatment effect
is identified off of variation between blocks that are likely to be constrained within my
sample period versus blocks that are less likely to be constrained.
My empirical framework is similar in spirit to the regression kink design (RKD) in
Card, Lee, and Pei (2009). The strategy is to identify kinks in the outcome variable that
coincide with kinks in the policy rule while controlling flexibly for the assignment variable
used to determine the policy rule (ethnic proportions). The kink at the quota limit is key.
The identification strategy relies on the step function of the quota status where units are
unconstrained (the quota status is 0) below the quota limit on ethnic proportions and units
are constrained (the quota status is 1) above the limit.
While the setup is very similar to regression discontinuity design (Angrist and Lavy,
1999; Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw, 2001), it does not fit within a standard regression
discontinuity design (RDD) framework (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux,
2010) because the running variable of interest (ethnic proportions) is endogenous. There-
fore, the identification strategy is more similar to Card, Lee, and Pei (2009)’s study on
the impact of previous earnings (an endogenous running variable) on unemployment in-
surance benefits. They argue that even though workers can control their earnings, lack of
information on the precise location of the kink-point can rule out extreme forms of sorting.
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The identification assumption is that all households are unable to precisely control
treatment assignment around the threshold so that variation in the treatment assignment
around the limit is as good as randomized. It is not a violation of the identification as-
sumption if households can exert some control over the running variable as long as they
do not precisely control on which side of the limit they land (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). It
is hard for households to sort precisely around the quota limit because they do not know
ethnic proportions. Moreover, HDB only reports monthly indicator variables of whether
an apartment block is constrained but does not publish the history of each block’s treat-
ment status. So, households cannot see how frequently blocks are switching between the
constrained and unconstrained status to infer how close blocks are to the quota limit.
There are several limitations to my empirical framework that are mostly data driven.
First, the ideal running variable would be pre-policy ethnic proportions at the apartment
block level. Since the policy was announced and implemented within 3 weeks, this would
have been an ideal natural experiment because households would not be able to manipulate
treatment assignment by sorting. For various reasons, data on ethnic proportions are not
publicly available at the local level and I was not able to obtain the 1989 phonebook.
Absent the pre-policy data, the next best candidate would have been monthly admin-
istrative data on ethnic proportions that HDB uses to determine whether a block is quota-
constrained or not. Using names in annual phonebooks to proxy for monthly ethnic propor-
tions introduces two sources of measurement error. First, names may not match perfectly
to ethnicities. This measurement error should bias against estimating any discontinuities.
Even if names are perfect measures of ethnicities, annual phonebooks miss the monthly
variation so that the actual quota status could be constrained for some months even though
the annual ethnic proportion is below the quota limit. Another approach would be to use
switchers (apartment blocks that switch from constrained to unconstrained across months
or vice versa) but there are too few switchers during my sample period. Below, I show that
my proxy is a valid measure of ethnic proportions.
Finally, I have a limited set of observables. While the number of controls is small
compared to other studies of housing markets, the observables I have can explain a sim-
ilar amount of variation in prices as these studies because public housing in Singapore is
less heterogeneous than private housing in the United States. I am able to explain up to
95% of the variation in prices by using just sale type dummies, block fixed effects and
month-of-sale fixed effects.30 In my analysis, I control for location amenities using town
and neighborhood fixed effects. HDB neighborhoods are comparable to US census block
30In Levitt and Syverson (2008), the most saturated regression specification explains 96% of the variation
in house prices in Boston, using block fixed effects and a rich set of controls (including keywords in descrip-
tions in the Multiple Listing Service). Using a similar dataset for the housing market in Wisconsin, Hendel,




In this section, I first describe the main results on transaction outcomes, then, discuss take-
away lessons from these estimates. The main take-away is that segregation preferences
leads to worse market outcomes for constrained units, primarily through quantity effects.
These point to distortionary costs because some sellers are restricted from selling to buyers
of the higher WTP ethnic group. Together, my findings quantify the distortionary effects of
imposing restrictions in the housing market to enhance diversity. Finally, I discuss major




Table 4 reports statistically significant effects on prices for Chinese-, Malay- and
Indian-constrained blocks versus comparable unconstrained blocks. Column 1 estimates
equation (3) and only controls for polynomials of ethnic proportions. Column 2 adds con-
trols on the age of the block and its squared, the proportion of each of the seven types of
units (type 1 is the omitted group), town and month-of-sale fixed effects and column 3
adds town-by-month linear trends. My preferred specification for price effects (column 3)
can explain 75% to 80% of the variation in prices.
On average, the transaction price for Chinese-constrained units is 5% higher than trans-
actions in comparable unconstrained blocks. Conversely, the prices for Malay- and Indian-
constrained units are 3% lower. The signs of these effects are consistent with E4 in the
theoretical framework. The size of these price differences represent 5 times the median
monthly income of the Chinese (S$2,335) and 3 times the median monthly income of the
Malays (S$1,790) and the Indians (S$2,167).31
The magnitudes of the price effects are comparable to the literature. Marion (2009)
finds that removal of affirmative-action type restrictions for highway construction con-
tracts in California led to a 5.6% decline in the cost of state-funded contracts (treatment
group) relative to federally funded projects. Matsa and Miller (2013) report that the in-
troduction of gender quotas in Norwegian corporate boards did not impact most corporate
decisions, except employment. Relative labor costs as a share of assets increased by 4.1%
for firms with gender quotas compared to the control group. My price effects are slightly
31Calculated using the average price of units sold (S$234,000).
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smaller than estimated price effects of other types of housing regulation but of the same
order of magnitude. Autor, Palmer, and Pathak (2012) find that transaction prices for for-
mer rent controlled units increased by 6% to 8% following the removal of rent control in
Cambridge. Wang (2011) finds a net increase in the equilibrium price of housing of 7.5%,
following the privatization of state-owned housing in China.
As discussed in the theory, the policy affects transaction prices through two mech-
anisms: demand-side choice restrictions and segregation preferences versus supply-side
choice restrictions and thin markets. Equation (2) shows that the differences in average
prices estimated here are a weighted average of positive price differences (weighted by
the share of Chinese buyers - type 4 transactions) and negative price differences (weighted
by the share of non-Chinese buyers - type 2 and type 3 transactions), where the positive
effects are due to supply-side choice restrictions and thin markets (E3) and the negative
effects are due to demand-side choice restrictions and segregation preferences (E1). I use
the opposite price effects of these two mechanisms to disentangle them.
The lower average prices for Malay and Indian quotas are consistent with demand-side
choice restrictions and segregation preferences. When the non-segregated group (non-
Malays and non-Indians) cannot sell to the segregated group (Malays and Indians), the
restricted sellers have to accept lower transaction prices to attract buyers from the non-
segregated group who have a lower WTP. These lower prices point to costs that can arise
due to allocative inefficiencies because the policy restricts some owners from selling to the
buyer with the highest WTP.
By contrast, average prices are higher for transactions in Chinese-constrained blocks
compared to transactions in unconstrained blocks close to the Chinese quota limit. I first
show evidence that both mechanisms (lower prices due to demand-side choice restrictions
and segregation preferences and higher prices due to supply-side choice restrictions and
thin markets) underly these differences in average price. Then, I explain why the net effect
is positive.
To test for the first mechanism (lower prices due to demand-side choice restrictions
and segregation preferences), I interact the quota dummy in equation (3) with two proxies
for non-Chinese buyers: a dummy for neighborhoods with above median shares of Malay
movers and a dummy for neighborhoods with above median shares of Indian movers.32
The discussion above for equation (2) spells out that differences in average prices are
a weighted average of positive and negative differences but the negative price differences
32As discussed in Section 3, I do not have data on the ethnicity of the buyer and seller. In the data
appendix, I show how to use the ethnic distribution of movers (calculated using the phonebook) to proxy
for the ethnic distribution of buyers. Since there are very few movers for each block, I cannot calculate this
share at the block level because the shares are too noisy. I also control for these dummies for high mover
shares separately, in addition to the interaction terms.
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increases with the share of non-Chinese buyers. Indeed, I find that the Chinese quota effect
on average prices decreases as the share of movers who are Malay increases, consistent
with Malay buyers having different preferences than Chinese buyers. I do not find this for
Indian mover shares (the results are in Table A3 and more details are in Section 2 of the
data appendix).
To test for the second mechanism (higher prices due to supply-side choice restrictions
and thin markets), I investigate how treatment effects on average prices vary with the
availability of housing substitutes in an HDB town. If the supply restriction matters for the
marginal Chinese buyer, its effect on prices should be weaker if there are more substitutes
available for the marginal Chinese buyer.
I expand my main treatment effect specification (equation (4)) to include an interaction
of the Chinese quota dummy with the log of the (de-meaned) size of the housing stock in
a town (my proxy for the availability of housing substitutes) and also controlling for the
housing stock separately (this specification drops town fixed effects). My results indicate
that in towns with a larger housing stock (more substitutes available), the positive premium
is indeed smaller because more substitutes are available so the impact of the supply-side
restriction on prices is weaker (the results are in Table A4 and more details are discussed
in Section 3 of the data appendix).
The results from these two tests show that both mechanisms (E1 and E3) underly dif-
ferences in average prices for Chinese-constrained blocks versus unconstrained blocks.
But, the net effect on average prices is heavily weighted towards the effect due to supply-
side choice restrictions (higher prices for constrained blocks) because the Chinese are the
overwhelming majority of buyers. Using the phonebook data on the ethnic distribution of
movers, I calculate that the share of movers moving into Chinese-constrained blocks who
are Chinese is 74% (proxy of s4 in equation (2)) and the share who are non-Chinese is
26% (proxy of s2 + s3). Given these shares, the price decrease due to segregation pref-
erences (E1) has to be almost 3 times as large as the price increase due to thin markets
(E3), for the average prices to be lower for the constrained blocks compared to the uncon-
strained blocks. In other words, unless the marginal non-Chinese buyer moving into the
constrained block really dislikes living in Chinese communities, the average price is likely
to be weakly higher for the Chinese-constrained block.
In summary, the analysis above points to price effects due to demand-side choice re-
strictions and segregation preferences for all three quotas.33 There is also evidence that
supply-side choice restrictions and market thinness leads to higher average prices for
33The effects on average prices are consistent with estimates of segregation preferences in the literature
(Wong (2013); Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007)). Using the difference in WTP estimates between eth-
nic groups, I calculate that the implied differences in average prices between constrained and unconstrained
blocks will be similar to the estimates in Table 4.
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Chinese-constrained blocks. Next, I discuss robustness checks and the validity of the
price effect estimates in Table 4.
Following Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) and Bellows and Miguel (2009), I calculate
how large selection on unobservables would need to be to explain away the entire price
difference.34 To do this, I divide my preferred estimate with controls (column 3) by the dif-
ference between the estimate without controls (column 1) and the estimate with controls.
The larger the magnitude of this ratio, the more unlikely it is that the effect estimated is
driven by selection on unobservables. The magnitude of the ratio is large if the effect to
be explained away is large (the numerator) or if controlling for more observables does not
change the estimate much (the denominator is small). In their paper, Altonji, Elder, and
Taber (2005) report that a ratio of 3.55 would make selection on unobservables “highly
unlikely” and a ratio of 1.43 would make it seem “unlikely”. The ratio for the Chinese
quota is 1.61 35 and the ratio for the Malay (Indian) quota is 2.15 (-6.12). Therefore, it
seems unlikely that selection of unobservables can explain the entire price effect.
The price effects fall to 3%, -0.7% and -1% for Chinese, Malay and Indian quotas
respectively when I control for neighborhood fixed effects instead of town fixed effects
(column 4). Estimates with neighborhood fixed effects are identified from comparing
constrained blocks versus unconstrained blocks within a neighborhood. The strength of
these estimates are that they control for locational amenities for a small area (comparable
to US census blocks). But, the weakness is that it is only identified off of neighborhoods
that have within neighborhood variation in quota dummies. In my sample, more than
half of the neighborhoods have no within neighborhood variation for Chinese and Malay
quota dummies and more than a third of the neighborhoods have no within neighborhood
variation for Indian quota dummies. For this reason, I report estimates for column 3 (town
fixed effects) as my preferred specification. My main take-away is that price effects are
still significant even controlling for neighborhood fixed effects. Furthermore, in Section
6.3, I discuss confounders to the estimates in column 3 (no neighborhood fixed effects) and
argue that the price and quantity effects are most consistent with the model’s predictions
(choice restrictions affect transaction outcomes) while unobserved locational amenities
alone cannot explain all the price and quantity effects.
Finally, column 5 adds block fixed effects (there are no controls because all the controls
are time-invariant attributes at the block level). Identification is from time series variation
in the quota status of a block. The coefficient estimates are insignificant because there
34Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) consider an empirical model with a bivariate normal structure while
Bellows and Miguel (2009) develop the same test for a linear model that does not rely on the assumption
of joint normality (this approach was also adopted by Nunn and Wantchekon (2011)). I adopt the latter
approach because my estimation methods are closer to Bellows and Miguel (2009).
35Calculated using 0.050/(0.081-0.050).
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are too few blocks that switch quota status within my short sample period. The estimates
using separate polynomials for constrained and unconstrained units are similar but there is
less statistical power (see Appendix, Table A1). The main results are similar but are less
robust for Indian quotas.
Figures 2a to 2c summarize these effects. The figures also show that price dispersion
is larger for constrained units, consistent with segregation preferences.36 By limiting arbi-
trage, the ethnic-based restrictions of the policy allow equilibrium prices to differ by buyer
ethnicity, leading to larger price dispersion for constrained units.
Type of unit sold
Table 5 reports estimates for equations (3) and (4), except the outcome is now the type
of HDB unit sold. This regression tests for compositional differences in the types of units
sold.37
The type of HDB unit is one of the most important attribute in public housing. The
resale data published on HDB’s website is organized by location and HDB unit type, pre-
sumably because many households search for comparables by unit type and location. A
regression of lnprice on month-of-sale and neighborhood fixed effects explains 32% of the
variation. Just adding dummies for the type of unit sold (from the resale data) increases
the R-squared to 86%. Higher types are more expensive. The coefficient on these type
dummies are monotonically increasing with types and almost linear if we plot the coeffi-
cient estimates of the type dummies on the vertical axis and the type of unit sold on the
horizontal axis. Therefore, I use an ordered probit specification where the dependent vari-
able is an integer between one and eight, representing eight different types of HDB units.
36I did test whether the variance in price is higher for the constrained blocks but there was not enough
statistical power in the data because this comparison is only cross-sectional (I have to calculate variance of
prices for each block, then compare across blocks), whereas my main regressor (whether the quota is binding
for block b in month t) has both time-series and cross-sectional variation.
37An alternative specification would control for type of unit sold in the analysis of price effects (Table 4).
I did do this and the results on price effects are similar. On average, prices are 4.5% higher for Chinese-
constrained blocks, 2.9% lower for Malay-constrained blocks and 3.7% lower for Indian-constrained blocks.
This analysis repeats column (3) of Table 4, and also controls for dummies of the type of unit sold, and
also other attributes in the transactions data (see Section 3), including the storey of the unit, and the area.
Including these attributes of sold units explains 90% of the price variation. I chose to report the effects on
prices and type of unit sold separately because the latter is an endogenous choice and a potential treatment
effect of the policy. In other words, including controls for the types of unit sold would lead to bias from
“over-controlling” (the type of unit sold could be correlated with prices, the dependent variable for Table 4,
and the quota dummy, the regressor for Table 4). While I do not control for type of unit sold in Table 4, I do
control for the compositional differences in the stock of HDB units using data from the census of HDB flat
types. Therefore, the differences in average prices between constrained and unconstrained blocks adjust for
compositional differences between these blocks.
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I control for whether the quota is binding in the past month and fourth order polynomials
of ethnic proportions. A higher number indicates a higher priced type.
The types of unit sold in constrained blocks are lower-priced units for Chinese and
Malay quotas but the magnitudes of the effects are small. Indian-constrained units that are
sold are not significantly different. The marginal effects for the Chinese quotas translate
to a 2.8% increase in probability for type 3 units and a 1.8% and 1.09% decrease in the
probabilities for type 5 and type 6 units (all 10% significant). The magnitudes are also
small for the Malay and Indian quotas.
Proportion of units sold in a block
Table 6 reports the impact of the quota on the proportion of units sold (equation 5).
As discussed in E5 in the theory, we expect β to be negative. Panel A includes all HDB
blocks that have appeared in the resale transactions website. Panel B includes all HDB
blocks in the Ethnic Integration Policy website, including blocks that did not have a resale
transaction during my sample period (I set proportion units sold to 0 for these blocks). My
preferred specification includes town fixed effects (there are no month fixed effects because
this specification collapses the transactions level data used to estimate price effects to the
block level) and includes blocks with no units sold during my sample period (Panel B,
columns 2, 5 and 8).
The proportions of units sold are 0.7 to 1.3 percentage points lower when we increase
the percent of months the quota binds from zero to one. Alternatively, if we increased the
main regressor (the percent of months the quota is binding for a block) by one standard
deviation, the proportions of units sold falls by 0.24% for the Chinese quotas, 0.38% for
the Malay quotas and 0.27% for the Indian quotas. The mean of the dependent variable is
4.5% if we include all blocks.
Another way is to translate these effects into durations. On average, 0.27% of units
in a block are sold in a month. Going from no exposure to full exposure (increasing the
regressor from zero to one) translates to units being on the market 3 months longer for the
Chinese and Indian quotas and 5 months longer for the Malay quotas. If we increased the
key regressor by one standard deviation, we would increase the duration on the market by
about one month for the Chinese and Indian quotas and 1.4 months for the Malay quotas.
These effects are economically significant. Ong and Koh (2000) report that the mean time
on market is less than two months and the median is slightly longer than a month (42
days).
The incidence of this effect is likely to fall more on non-segregated sellers because
sellers from the segregated group can sell to all ethnic groups. These quantity effects are
larger than those in the literature. For example, Marion (2009) finds that the removal of af-
firmative action policies on state-funded procurement contracts did not affect the average
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number of bidders. Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011) report that preferential treatment
towards small firms in highway procurement bids lead to small changes in overall par-
ticipation (approximately 1%) but large heterogeneity on participation effects for small
bidders (the favored group) versus large bidders.
6.2 Discussion of results
In summary, I find price effects comparable to the literature and larger quantity effects. Ef-
fects on types of units sold are small. Returning to the discussion of deadweight loss and
incidence at the end of Section 4, my overall assessment is that the evidence of segrega-
tion preferences from price effects point to allovative inefficiencies (not all units are sold
to buyers with the highest WTP) and the quantity effects suggest some trades that have
positive surplus do not occur. My overall assessment on incidence is that non-segregated
sellers for the Chinese-, Malay- and Indian-constrained blocks appear to be bearing the
costs (their units appear to sell for lower prices, as predicted by E1, and their units are also
harder to sell). Chinese buyers of Chinese-constrained blocks are also hurt because they
have to pay higher prices, as predicted by E3 (this is primarily a transfer to Chinese sellers
of Chinese-constrained blocks).
These estimated policy effects on prices and quantities of sold housing units suggest
the transaction value of quota-constrained units is between 13% to 27% lower than compa-
rable, unconstrained blocks.38 Specifically, I compute how transaction value (price times
quantity sold) differs for constrained and unconstrained blocks by using treatment effect
estimates on prices and quantities to calculate how differences in prices and differences
in quantities affect differences in transaction values. This approach allows me to deter-
mine the relative importance of quantity versus price effects. My calculations suggest
that more than 80% of the impact on transaction values is due to reductions in the num-
ber of constrained units sold.39 Interestingly, even though average prices are higher for
Chinese-constrained blocks, the transaction value is lower because fewer units are sold.
These results illustrate how distortionary costs can arise when restrictions are imposed to
encourage diversity in the housing market.40
38I provide more details of these calculations in Table A5 and Section 4 of the data appendix. However, I
caution that these calculations on differences in transaction values do not represent the full efficiency effects.
First, this calculation misses the values of housing units that do not sell. Second, this calculation also misses
the general equilibrium effects due to the introduction of the policy (as discussed in Section 5).
39In an analysis of tipping behavior, Card, Mas, and Rothstein (2008) also find that most of the housing
market response to tipping is in the quantity domain.
40To be clear, not all “distortions” are bad. For example, if there are existing imperfections such as
imperfect information that leads to statistical discrimination, “distortionary effects” due to quotas could
offset existing imperfections, leading to efficiency gains.
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These results echo some of the findings in the literature on the distortionary effects of
diversity-enhancing policies. In addition to the results discussed above by Marion (2009)
and Matsa and Miller (2013), Bertrand, Hanna, and Mullainathan (2010) finds that caste-
based affirmative action quotas in India reduce the number of females entering engineer-
ing colleges. On the other hand, McCrary (2007) finds that court-ordered hiring quotas
increased the fraction of African Americans among newly hired police officers while city
crime rates appear unaffected.41
An important lesson is that diversity-enhancing policies can exacerbate existing fric-
tions, especially in the housing market. This contrasts against a literature on second-best
choices suggesting distortions from diversity policies could offset existing imperfections in
the market, leading to efficiency gains.42 Here, the main friction is thin markets, which are
characterized with having few transactions relative to the stock. The higher average prices
for Chinese-constrained units and the large quantity effects are evidence that restricting
trade in thin markets can lead to worse market outcomes for both buyers and sellers. Chi-
nese buyers have to pay higher prices because there are no substitutes in the unconstrained
blocks due to thin markets. There are fewer units sold for constrained blocks, worsening
the thin market problem.
Investigating distortionary effects on housing transactions is important because the
ease of selling houses has been shown to affect the mobility of households.43 Effects
on transaction values are also important because housing transactions have been shown
to have spillover effects on the broader economy (See Mian et al. (2013); Mian and Sufi
(2011)) and housing transaction taxes are an important source of tax revenue in Singa-
pore.44
These results have policy implications beyond Singapore. As discussed in Section 2,
many countries have residential desegregation programs, and some include quota limits.
My results indicate that location preferences are inelastic because of segregation prefer-
ences. Placing restrictions on where households can locate to encourage desegregation can
41This is consistent with my framework. These policies impose group preferences that encourage the
allocation of resources toward the favored group. The potential for allocative inefficiencies depends on
how different the groups are. It is conceivable that the skill distribution for police candidates might be
more similar across ethnic groups, compared to the distribution of test scores (the main admission criteria
in Bertrand, Hanna, and Mullainathan (2010)) for different castes in India or the distribution of WTP in
housing markets for different ethnic groups.There is a long literature on differences in test scores between
ethnic groups (Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor, 2009) and differences in housing preferences (Bayer, Ferreira,
and McMillan, 2007).
42See, for example, Holzer and Neumark (2000); Corns and Schotter (1999); McAfee and McMillan
(1989).
43There is a large literature relating housing to household mobility. See, for example, Ferreira, Gyourko,
and Tracy (2010).
44In 2012, housing transaction taxes made up 10% of tax revenue in Singapore.
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lead to worse transaction outcomes for restricted households.
Moreover, these results suggest it might take a long time to achieve desegregation
goals. In the case of Singapore, the policy bans housing transactions that increase the eth-
nic proportions farther above the limits. Over time, as more housing transactions occur,
in effect, the policy exerts downward pressure on ethnic proportions in constrained areas.
However, this process occurs slowly due to thin markets (only 5% of the housing stock
trades in a year) and inelastic preferences. The fact that many blocks are still above the
quota limits sixteen years after the policy was introduced, and that there are still mean-
ingful differences in transaction outcomes between constrained and unconstrained blocks
suggest the combination of inelastic preferences and thin markets could explain why this
process is so slow. In a separate paper that uses quasi-experimental variation from the
quota policy to structurally estimate preferences and simulate the first best allocation of
ethnic groups to neighborhoods, Wong (2013) finds that sixteen years after the policy, only
30% of neighborhoods are within one standard deviation of the first best allocation.
6.3 Threats to identification/Alternative stories
The preceding subsections interpret the results as treatment effects of the policy on transac-
tion outcomes and discussed how two mechanisms of the policy can explain the estimated
effects. The idea is that constrained blocks differ from unconstrained blocks because the
choice restrictions of the policy could lead to differences in transaction outcomes. My
empirical strategy compares transaction outcomes of constrained versus unconstrained
blocks, restricting the analysis to blocks close to the quota limits, controlling flexibly for
polynomials of ethnic proportions and a set of observables that can explain much of the
outcome variation in my data. Still, the main concern remains that constrained and ob-
servably comparable unconstrained blocks are different along other unobservable dimen-
sions that are also correlated outcomes. Here, I discuss possible biases to the estimates
and alternative stories that could confound my results. The bottom line is the results are
most consistent with the predictions of the model: the pattern of higher average prices
for Chinese-constrained blocks, lower average prices for Malay- and Indian-constrained
blocks, and lower proportions of units sold is most consistent with the choice restrictions of
the quota causing differences in prices and quantities for constrained versus unconstrained
blocks.
Geographic clustering of constrained blocks and neighborhoods
One concern is that quota dummies are not randomly assigned leading to a bias in
the estimation of β ’s, as discussed in the empirical framework. Quota dummies are en-
dogenous because ethnic proportions (used to determine quota status) are correlated with
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unobserved ethnic-specific amenities (Chinese want to live near Chinese temples, for ex-
ample).
To benchmark how the spatial pattern of constrained locations deviates from random
assignment, I quantify how evenly distributed quota-constrained blocks and neighbor-
hoods are by calculating dissimilarity indices for block quotas and neighborhood quotas.
This index is commonly used to measure residential segregation. It calculates the percent
of households in an ethnic group who would have to change locations to produce an even
distribution. Any location with an index between 30 to 60% is moderately segregated
and locations with an index above 60% is very segregated (Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor,
1999). Instead of counting black versus white households, I apply the same idea to count
constrained versus unconstrained blocks or neighborhoods. If quota status is randomly
assigned, we would expect constrained blocks and neighborhoods to be evenly distributed
spatially. Since there are quota limits at the block and neighborhood level, I calculate
dissimilarity indices at the block and neighborhood level by using the monthly quota data
from the HDB website. I provide more details on these calculations in Section 5 of the
data appendix.
The average dissimilarity index for neighborhood quotas is 56% and the average dis-
similarity index for block quotas is 28% indicating that neighborhood quotas are moder-
ately clustered (a moderate number of neighborhoods will have to switch status to achieve
an even distribution) but block quotas are relatively evenly distributed. Consequently, one
concern is that neighborhood quota status could be correlated with unobserved amenities.
To address this, I use neighborhood fixed effects to control for time invariant amenities at
the neighborhood level. Some of the results are weaker with neighborhood fixed effects
but still statistically significant. The quantity effects are still significant for Chinese and
Malay quotas, price effects are weaker (as discussed in Section 6.1).
Measurement error in ethnic proportions
Another concern is that I do not have administrative data of ethnic proportions that
HDB uses to determine which blocks are above the quota limits. In other words, my proxy
for ethnic proportions (calculated using the phonebook) may not correlate with actual
ethnic proportions.
To address this concern, I test whether there is a jump in the probability that the quota
binds at the block quota limit. To do this, I regress the monthly quota status from the
HDB website on a dummy that is 1 if ethnic proportions are above the block quota limit
(calculated using the phonebook data) while controlling for fourth order polynomials of
ethnic proportions. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. Figure 3a summarizes
the effect of being in a block with 87% or more Chinese on the probability that the Chinese
quota binds in a month. Figures 3b and 3c measure the same effect for Malay and Indian
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block quotas.45
There is a statistically significantly positive discontinuity in the probability that the
quota binds, right at the policy thresholds associated with the Chinese, Malay and Indian
quotas. The magnitudes of the jumps are 23%, 12% and 10% for the Chinese, Malay and
Indian quotas (all significant at the 1% level).
The probability that the quota binds is greater than 0 below the quota limits and less
than 1 above the quota limits due to two reasons. First, there is time series variation
because the quota data from the HDB website (vertical axis) is monthly and the phonebook
data (horizontal axis) is annual. Conditional on the ethnic proportions from the phonebook
data, whether a quota is binding or not can change from month to month. Secondly, there is
measurement error in the matching of names to ethnicities, as discussed in the data section.
The noise introduced by the measurement error would bias against finding discontinuities
unless the measurement error is correlated with the quota status, which seems unlikely.
This exercise validates the matching of names to ethnicities and my proxies for ethnic
proportions. If the match quality was poor, we would not observe an upward jump at the
quota limit (defined using the phonebook data).
Endogenous supply adjustments
Since the HDB has perfect information of the ethnic proportions (HDB uses this data
to enforce the policy), it is possible that HDB expands supply differentially in areas above
and below the quota limits,46 so that a comparison of constrained and unconstrained blocks
could just be a comparison of unobservably different types of units. Below, I test for
compositional differences in the stock of HDB units for constrained versus unconstrained
blocks and find that the differences are small and cannot fully explain my main results.
I quantify compositional differences in the housing stock using the proportion of an
HDB block that is of each HDB type. As discussed in Section 6.1, there are eight types of
HDB units and higher types are higher price. Specifically, I use data from the HDB census
to calculate the proportion of type 3, proportion of type 4, proportion of type 5, proportion
of type 6 units in each block. (Table 7).47 Columns 1, 3 and 5 report results using all blocks
45Figures 3b and 3c show a kink in the predicted probability around 50% above the Malay quota limit
(25%) and the Indian quota limit (13%) because there are too few blocks with more than 75% Malays and
more than 63% Indians, given that Malays and Indians are only 14% and 8% of the population.
46Actually, while HDB does have perfect information, it may be challenging to precisely impact supply
differentially around the quota limits because new units built by HDB enters into the primary lottery market
only. These units are only eligible for resale after five years. For HDB to manipulate supply, it would have
to predict ethnic proportions five years later. Also, HDB mostly develops new satellite towns en masse,
which will make it hard to to selectively expand supply within existing towns with segregated blocks and
neighborhoods. In my analysis, I use town fixed effects to control for differential supply across towns.
47There are 8 types of units. I only used 4 types in the regression because there are too few type 1, type 2,
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that are within 10% of the Chinese, Malay and Indian quotas respectively. Columns 2, 4
and 6 report results using only blocks that were built before the policy started in 1989.
Chinese-constrained blocks have significantly more type 4 units, but significantly fewer
type 6 units (column 1, Table 7). The proportions of type 3 and type 5 units are not signifi-
cantly different. While these significant differences in observable attributes are a concern,
it is comforting that the sign and magnitude of the coefficients are not monotonic in the
type of the units. It does not appear that Chinese-constrained units tend to have system-
atically more high priced units even though the Chinese are the group with the highest
median income. Differences between Malay-constrained and -unconstrained blocks are
statistically and economically insignificant. Malay-constrained blocks have 2% more type
6 units (10% sig.), but the magnitude is small and this difference existed before the pol-
icy (column 4). Indian-constrained blocks have fewer type 3 units and more type 4 and
type 6 units. These differences also persisted since before the quota policy was introduced
(column 6).
In summary, there is some evidence of compositional differences between constrained
and unconstrained blocks but these differences persisted before 1989 (they do not appear
to be due to differential supply adjustements by HDB after the policy was introduced).
Also, these differences are not large and all my analysis controls for these compositional
differences.
Unobserved housing quality
One concern is that Chinese-constrained blocks have higher average prices (but Malay-
and Indian-constrained blocks do not) because the Chinese have higher income, higher
income households own better houses. So, Chinese-constrained units have unobservably
higher quality. If this is the case, then, we would still find price differences even if the true
policy effect on prices is zero.
It is unlikely that the premium for Chinese-constrained blocks (reported in Table 4)
is driven by unobserved housing quality only. First, if the quota restrictions had no im-
pact on prices, and Chinese-constrained units are of higher quality, then, we should not
see more price dispersion for Chinese-constrained units (as shown in Figure 2a) and the
proportion of units sold are also unlikely to be lower for units that are more likely to be
Chinese-constrained if they are higher quality (reported in Table 6). Finally, I find statisti-
cally significant price effects even after controlling for neighborhood fixed effects (this is
equivalent to controlling for locational rents at the US census block group level).
Endogenous sorting around the quota limits
type 7 and type 8 units in the resale market. The R-squared of a regression of lnprice on proportion type 3 to
proportion type 6 is 0.65 and including the other types only increases the R-squared by 0.007.
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One benefit of having ethnic proportions at the block level is that I can use well-known
tests in the regression kink design literature to check for endogenous sorting around the
quota limits. One concern is that ethnic-based restrictions of the policy might incentivize
ethnic groups to differentially sort above and below the quota limits. This endogenous
sorting behavior would bias treatment effect estimates if the difference in the ethnic com-
position of sellers is correlated with unobserved housing quality.
I test for bunching patterns below and do not find evidence that non-random sorting is
driving my treatment effect estimates. This is plausible, as suggested by Card, Lee, and
Pei (2009) and discussed in Section 5, because households do not have perfect information
of the ethnic proportions (this data is not public which is why I had to match names in the
phonebook to ethnicities).
Figure 4 shows estimates of the densities of the running variables (McCrary, 2008). As
shown in Figures 4a and 4c, the densities of block level Chinese and Indian proportions
are not statistically significantly discontinuous at the quota limits. The log difference in
heights are -0.048 (0.06 s.e.) and .009 (0.08 s.e.) respectively. Figure 4b shows that there
is evidence of bunching right above the Malay quota limit. The log difference in height is
0.20 (0.08 s.e.).
One reason for this pattern of bunching is that Malays have very strong preferences
for living in Malay enclaves perhaps because they tend to have larger families and want
to live close to families. Since the policy had reduced the number of Malay enclaves
tremendously, they have a lower propensity to leave Malay-constrained units. By match-
ing names and postal codes in the 2005 and 2006 phonebook, I can identify stayers (see
discussion in Section 3). Indeed, I do find that Malays are slightly more likely to stay in
quota-constrained blocks.48
However, this bunching pattern is not consistent with Malays who are manipulating
their treatment status. Malays who are manipulating their treatment status would have
more incentive to bunch below the quota limit. Malay owners of constrained units face
a trade-off of higher prices versus lower proportion of units sold. Given the small price
effects and large quantity effects in Tables 4 and 6, it seems more likely that the latter
effect would dominate (they would prefer to bunch below). But, I find that they bunch
above (because location preferences are inelastic).
Moreover, if Malays bunched above the quota cutoff because of the prospect of higher
prices (because of the effect due to E3), this would then bias against the negative price
effects that I estimate in Table 4. In summary, I conclude that bunching is unlikely to
48I looked at two outcomes: The number of stayers who are Malay divided by the number of households in
a block and the number of stayers who are Malay divided by the number of stayers in a block. The estimates
are 0.4% for the first outcome (relative to all households) and 3.4% for the second outcome (relative to all
stayers). Both estimates are significant at the 1% level.
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explain the price effects in Table 4 and appears to be inconsistent with households who are
manipulating their treatment status.
Endogenous sorting out of public housing markets
Another concern is that households who have strong segregation preferences (who
do not like to be restricted by the quota policy) might sort into private housing markets
where there are likely to be more segregated neighborhoods. Consequently, I could have a
sample selection problem because I only observe transactions in the public housing market.
The previous sorting problem affects the internal validity of the treatment effect estimates
(constrained and unconstrained HDB blocks are not comparable) but this problem affects
the external validity (HDB households are selected).
This selection problem will lead to weaker price effects. The impact of demand-side
choice restrictions and segregation preferences (E1) on prices is identified off of the differ-
ence between the marginal non-segregated buyer’s lower WTP for units in the constrained
block and the WTP of the marginal buyer for the unconstrained block. If households with
strong segregation preferences sort out of the public housing market, this difference will
be smaller.
I test for the importance of this margin of selection by controlling for the share of
private housing nearby, which proxies for the ease for households to sort out of the public
housing markets. This test is admittedly imperfect because I do not observe the distribution
of private housing before the quota policy was introduced, but it is reassuring that the
treatment effects are robust to the availability of private housing nearby. I report the results
in Table A6 and discuss details in Section 6 of the data appendix.
Dynamic expectations of quota status
In addition, my theoretical framework above is also static. A dynamic model could
allow households to have expectations about whether the quota binds in the future. These
expectations on future treatment outcomes could lead to different reservation values for
sellers of constrained versus unconstrained blocks.
This type of forward-looking behavior would bias against finding discontinuities at the
cutoff. For units right below the quota cutoff, if Chinese sellers knew that once the quota
binds, there could be a premium for their units, the probability of capturing this premium
should already be priced into units that are ε% below the quota. In this case, prices for
Chinese-owned units should gradually increase as the percent of Chinese increases towards
the cutoff. Equivalently, if non-Chinese buyers recognize that once the quota binds, there
is a discrete downward jump in prices, this positive probability of the quota binding should
be priced into units that are ε% below the quota. Hence, prices for non-Chinese-owned
units should gradually decrease as the percent of Chinese increases towards 87%.
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7 Conclusion
Many desegregation policies take the form of quotas but it is hard to find the data to
evaluate these policies credibly because they are either not available publicly or there are
not enough observations close to the quota limits. This paper uses a hand-collected dataset
to study the impact of the ethnic housing quotas in Singapore, one of many residential
desegregation programs around the world.
I develop a model that shows that distortionary effects can arise when segregated and
non-segregated groups are different and some buyers’ and sellers’ choices are restricted.
The model illustrates two main mechanisms of the policy: (i) demand-side choice restric-
tions and segregation preferences and (ii) supply-side choice restrictions and thin markets.
I find evidence that segregation preferences are important for all three quotas. This sug-
gests location preferences are inelastic because of segregation preferences. I also find
support for supply-side constraints and thin markets for the Chinese quotas.
My results show price effects that are comparable to the literature and larger quan-
tity effects, leading to lower transaction values for constrained blocks versus observably
comparable unconstrained blocks. These results quantify the distortionary impact of a
residential desegregation program using housing transactions. They also suggest that, in
addition to the distortionary effects of the restrictions on housing transaction outcomes, it
will take a long time to achieve desegregation through quantity restrictions because loca-
tion preferences are inelastic and housing markets are thin.49 These lessons are central to
the design of desegregation policies beyond Singapore’s housing market.
These distortionary effects need to be weighed against the benefits from desegrega-
tion.50 This is constantly alluded to in the parliamentary debates in Singapore when the
costs and benefits of the policy are discussed (see Section 2). Quotas could lead to welfare
improvements by preventing extremely segregated outcomes. Due to externalities and tip-
ping behavior, a decentralized equilibrium may have too many segregated neighborhoods
relative to the first best.51 By preventing neighborhoods from becoming extremely segre-
49The relationship between choice heterogeneity and the distortionary effects due to choice restrictions
echoes the literature on the relative inefficiencies of quantity restrictions in international trade (this literature
emphasizes inefficiencies when products are differentiated and consumers have to imperfectly substitute
from consuming restricted products to consuming unrestricted products due to trade quotas). In housing,
imperfections due to thin markets can be large and further exacerbated by choice restrictions due to quotas
because of the two types of choice heterogeneity (segregation preferences and thin markets) highlighted in
my model.
50For example, Beaman et al. (2012) quantify the benefit of introducing gender quotas in politics and
Edin, Fredriksson, and Åslund (2004) study the benefits of a residential desegregation policy on immigrants.
51In a decentralized equilibrium, the first best allocation of ethnic groups may not be achieved because of
externalities (An individual chooses the neighborhood that maximizes his own utility, without internalizing
the effect of his choice on the ethnic proportions in the neighborhood).
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gated, if households prefer diversity, then, quotas could lead to welfare improvements.
In future work, it would be useful to have transaction level data by buyer and seller
ethnicity to study incidence. Another important outcome to look at would be the time the
property stays on the market. It would be useful to get pre-policy data, to test for general
equilibrium effects of the policy. Finally, it should be noted that the analysis in this paper
focuses on transactions close to the quota limits and results may differ for transactions
further away from the quota limits.
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Table 1 
Neighborhood and block level ethnic quotas a 
 
 






































Neighborhood Quotas Block Quotas National Proportion (2000)
Chinese 84% 87% 77%
Malay 22% 25% 14%
Indian 10% 13% 8%
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Level Description
Price 35744 234016 71943 40000 635000 Transaction Transaction price (Singapore dollars, 1 USD=1.62 SGD as of Mar 2005)
Flat type sold 35744 4 1 1 8 Transaction Flat type sold
Age 35744 18.20 9.24 3.00 40.00 Transaction Age of flat sold
Chinese Quota 133378 0.11 0.31 0 1 Month-Block Whether Chinese quota binds
Malay Quota 133378 0.12 0.32 0 1 Month-Block Whether Malay quota binds
Indian Quota 133378 0.22 0.41 0 1 Month-Block Whether Indian quota binds
Percent Sold 7222 4.99% 3.02% 0.34% 50.00% Block Percent of units in a block that was sold within the sample period
Percent Chinese 8007 77.91% 10.64% 0.00% 100.00% Block Percent of Chinese in a block
Percent Malay 8007 13.81% 9.40% 0.00% 100.00% Block Percent of Malay in a block
Percent Indian 8007 8.28% 5.55% 0.00% 83.33% Block Percent of Indian in a block
Percent Type 1 8007 0.05% 1.78% 0.00% 99.24% Block Percent of units in a block that is Type 1
Percent Type 2 8007 0.97% 8.26% 0.00% 100.00% Block Percent of units in a block that is Type 2
Percent Type 3 8007 23.42% 36.78% 0.00% 100.00% Block Percent of units in a block that is Type 3
Percent Type 4 8007 37.63% 34.07% 0.00% 100.00% Block Percent of units in a block that is Type 4
Percent Type 5 8007 24.88% 32.07% 0.00% 100.00% Block Percent of units in a block that is Type 5
Percent Type 6 8007 12.97% 32.24% 0.00% 100.00% Block Percent of units in a block that is Type 6
Percent Type 7 8007 0.01% 1.12% 0.00% 100.00% Block Percent of units in a block that is Type 7
Percent Type 8 8007 0.08% 2.62% 0.00% 100.00% Block Percent of units in a block that is Type 8
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Table 3 
Summary of predictions from the theoretical framework 
 
Thought experiment:  
Compare transactions for blocks with 86% Chinese (unconstrained) versus 88% Chinese (constrained) 
 
 
Types of transactions: 
Type 1: non-Chinese seller to Chinese buyer (banned) 
Type 2: non-Chinese seller to non-Chinese buyer 
Type 3: Chinese seller to non-Chinese buyer 
Type 4: Chinese seller to Chinese buyer 
 
* Notation: Let ௕ܲ௧ denote prices for transaction type t in block b. 
Predictions: 
E1: Prices for type 2 trades will be lower in the constrained blocks, ଼ܲଶ଼ ൑ ଼ܲ ଺ 
Non-Chinese sellers in the 88% blocks cannot sell to Chinese buyers. So, they have to accept lower transaction prices, in order to attract 
non-Chinese buyers. This is an example of demand-side choice restrictions leading to lower prices because of segregation preferences. 
E2: Non-Chinese buyers pay the same price regardless of seller ethnicity for constrained blocks, ଼ܲଶ଼ ൌ ଼ܲଷ଼  
There are no restrictions that limit non-Chinese buyers from arbitraging price differences between Chinese and non-Chinese sellers, so 
the prices of type 2 and type 3 trades should not differ in equilibrium for the 88% block. 
E3: Chinese buyers pay weakly higher prices for constrained blocks, ଼ܲସ଼ ൒ ଼ܲ ଺ 
Chinese buyers cannot buy from non-Chinese sellers of the 88% blocks. If markets are thin, there could be a wedge in the willingness-
to-pay between the marginal Chinese buyer's most preferred unit (that happens to be in the 88% block) and the second most preferred 
unit (that happens to be in the 86% block). This is an example of supply-side choice restrictions leading to higher prices because of thin 
markets. 
E4: ଼ܲ ଼തതതത ൒ ଼ܲ ଺. The inequality is the reverse for Malay and Indian quotas. 
Given E2, we can rewrite the differences in average prices as ሺݏଶ ൅ ݏଷሻሺ଼ܲଶ଼ െ ଼ܲ ଺ሻ ൅ ݏସሺ଼ܲସ଼ െ ଼ܲ ଺ሻ ൒ 0. The first difference is weakly 
negative (E1). The second difference is weakly positive (E3). We can bound the shares of transaction types for the constrained blocks. 
In the 88% blocks, there are 12% of non-Chinese (ݏଶ ൑ 12%ሻ. Because of E2 and E3, most Chinese sellers will sell to Chinese buyers 
first ݏଷ ൑ ݏସሻ. Therefore, the overall effect on prices is likely to be heavily weighted towards the weakly positive price difference (ݏସ 
is high). Finally, I use the phonebook data to check that the share of movers moving into Chinese-constrained blocks who are Chinese is 
74% (approximation of  ݏସ ) while the share who are non-Chinese is only 26% (approximation of ሺݏଶ ൅ ݏଷሻ. The inequality is the 
reverse for Malay and Indian quotas because the Chinese (the majority in Singapore) are part of the non-Malay and non-Indian groups. 
E5: Number of type 2 and type 3 trades is weakly lower, the number of type 4 trades is weakly higher 
Given the same distribution of reservation values of sellers, as transaction prices fall, the number of transactions would be weakly 


























a The regression equation is lnPriceibkt = α + β QCbk,t-1 +Σ4l=1 φl(percentCbk – 0.87)l  + εibkt where lnPriceibkt is the log of the price of transaction i in block b, 
town k  and month t; QCbk,t-1 is a dummy that is 1 if the Chinese quota is binding in the previous month; (percentCbk – 0.87)l are lth order polynomials of percent 
Chinese, centered around the block quota. The controls are other observable characteristics of the block (age of block, its squared, proportion of type 2 units, 
proportion of type 3 units, proportion of type 4 units, proportion of type 5 units, proportion of type 6 units, proportion of type 7 units, proportion of type 8 
units). I repeat the exercise for the Malay quota (Panel B) and for the Indian quota (Panel C). All specifications only use blocks that are within 10% of the 
Chinese, Malay, and Indian quota cutoffs, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the block level (columns 1 and 5), town level (columns 
2 and 3), neighborhood level (column 4). ***Statistically significant at 1%. **Statistically significant at 5%. *Statistically significant at 10%.  
  
Dependent variable ln price ln price ln price ln price ln price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Chinese quota
C .081*** .0503*** .0502*** .0321*** -0.00413
(.0166) (.0102) (.0104) (.00664) (.00872)
N 19533 19533 19533 19533 19533
R-squared 0.00926 0.798 0.799 0.825 0.892
Panel B: Malay quota
M -.0396*** -.0262*** -.027*** -.00697* 0.00564
(.0116) (.00762) (.00803) (.00374) (.00635)
N 14921 14921 14921 14921 14921
R-squared 0.0039 0.747 0.748 0.776 0.846
Panel C: Indian quota
I -.0285*** -.0332*** -.0341*** -.0109** 0.00133
(.0108) (.0109) (.0114) (.00488) (.00478)
N 32147 32147 32147 32147 32147
R-squared 0.00908 0.775 0.776 0.806 0.875
Ethnic proportions Y Y Y Y N
Controls N Y Y Y N
Month N Y Y Y N
Town N Y Y N N
Linear town-by-month trend N N Y N N
Neighborhood N N N Y N
Block N N N N Y
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Table 5 




a This is an ordered probit regression where the dependent variable is an integer between one and eight. The regressors are the same as column 1 of Table 5. All 
specifications only use blocks that are within 10% of the Chinese, Malay, and Indian quota cutoffs, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at 
the block level. ***Statistically significant at 1%. **Statistically significant at 5%. *Statistically significant at 10%. 
  
Quota Chinese Malay Indian
Dependent variable Flat Type Sold Flat Type Sold Flat Type Sold
(1) (2) (3)
Quota dummy -.0841* -.0854* 0.0273
(.0496) (.0449) (.0364)
Ethnic proportion -1.56 1.99* -2.79***
(1.06) (1.17) (1.04)
(Ethnic proportion)2 28.2 24.1 -39.7**
(25) (26.8) (20.1)
(Ethnic proportion)3 76.1 -140 291
(200) (179) (191)
(Ethnic proportion)4 -3134 -1830 6276**
(3223) (3149) (2639)
Type 1 -2.92*** -2.2*** -3.06***
(.312) (.0675) (.29)
Type 2 -2.25*** -.517*** -2.16***
(.0801) (.0461) (.0515)
Type 3 -.406*** .596*** -.357***
(.0379) (.0423) (.0339)
Type 4 .551*** 1.54*** .623***
(.034) (.0479) (.0329)
Type 5 1.51*** dropped 1.51***
(.0391) (.0372)
Type 6 3.52*** dropped 3.39***
(.165) (.128)
Type 7 3.65*** dropped 3.44***
(.196) (.14)
Observations 19533 14868 32147
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Table 6 




a The regression equation is pSoldbk = α + β percentQCbk +Σ4l=1 φlpercentClbk + εbk where pSoldbk is the proportion of units sold in block b, town k, aggregated 
across months; percentQCbk is the proportion of  months the Chinese (C) quota is binding; percentClbk are lth order polynomials of percent Chinese. All 
specifications only use observations within 10% of the quota cutoffs. I repeat the exercise for the Malay and for the Indian quotas. Standard errors in 
parentheses, clustered at the block level (columns 1, 4 and 7), town level (columns 2, 5 and 8) and neighborhood level (columns 3, 6 and 9). ***Statistically 




Dependent variable Proportion Sold Proportion Sold Proportion Sold Proportion Sold Proportion Sold Proportion Sold Proportion Sold Proportion Sold Proportion Sold
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Only blocks with resale transactions
Probability quota binds -.00544*** -.00456** -.00625*** -.0102*** -.00647*** -.00348* -.00623*** -.00466** -0.00171
(.00125) (.00177) (.00178) (.00147) (.00136) (.00207) (.000952) (.00193) (.00172)
N 3980 3980 3980 2906 2906 2906 6324 6324 6324
R-squared 0.0134 0.095 0.148 0.0172 0.121 0.188 0.0209 0.11 0.147
Panel B: Includes blocks without resale transactions
Probability quota binds -0.00195 -.00791*** -.00935*** -.00909*** -.0131*** -.00783*** -.00363*** -.00729** -0.00135
(.00127) (.00147) (.0019) (.0016) (.00237) (.00236) (.00102) (.00307) (.00181)
N 4347 3980 3980 3149 2906 2906 6818 6324 6324
R-squared 0.0109 0.0745 0.142 0.0103 0.097 0.181 0.00482 0.0863 0.137
Ethnic proportions Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Town N Y N N Y N N Y N








a The regression equation is ybk = α + β QCbkt +Σ4l=1 φl(percentCbk – 0.87)l + εbkt where ybk is the outcome variable (proportion type 3, proportion type 4, 
proportion type 5, proportion type 6 units in each block b, town k; QCbkt is a dummy that is 1 if the Chinese quota is binding in month t; (percentCbk – 0.87)l are 
lth order polynomials of percent Chinese, centered around the block quota cutoff. I repeat the exercise for the Malay quota and for the Indian quota. Columns 1, 
3 and 5 report results using all blocks that are within 10% of the Chinese, Malay, and Indian quota cutoffs, respectively. Columns 2, 4 and 6 report results 
using only the blocks that were built before the policy started in1989. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the block level. ***Statistically 






Sample Pre- and Post- Quota Pre-Quota Only Pre- and Post- Quota Pre-Quota Only Pre- and Post- Quota Pre-Quota Only
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Proportion of type 3 -0.00263 -.0796*** 0.00721 -0.0124 -.0273*** -.0403***
(.0156) (.018) (.0124) (.0145) (.00943) (.00993)
Proportion of type 4 .0456*** .0312* -0.0131 0.00716 .0189** .0215**
(.0153) (.0173) (.0121) (.0134) (.00892) (.0093)
Proportion of type 5 0.0102 .0518*** -0.00826 -0.01010 -0.00209 0.00383
(.0147) (.0162) (.0109) (.0119) (.00818) (.00861)
Proportion of type 6 -.061*** -0.0111 .0204* .0206* .0155* .0207**
(.0123) (.0125) (.0114) (.0119) (.00914) (.00891)
Observations 71713 63232 53008 45887 113985 107194
          Chinese                        Malay                       Indian             
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Source: Google Maps 
FIG. 1. –Map of HDB blocks and HDB neighborhoods. Each number in the map corresponds to an HDB block. There are 4 HDB neighborhoods in this map. 
Neighborhood 1 comprises all HDB blocks between 100 and 199, neighborhood 2 comprises all HDB blocks between 200 and 299, neighborhoods 4 and 5 are 
defined in a similar manner. 
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a. The Impact of Chinese Block Quotas on ln(price) 
      




b. The Impact of Malay Block Quotas on ln(price) 
   
      Deviation in Percent Malay in a Block Relative to the Quota Cutoff 
 
 
c. The Impact of Indian Block Quotas on ln(price) 
   
       Deviation in Percent Indian in a Block Relative to the Quota Cutoff 
 
  Fig. 2. Impact of block quotas on lnPrice, 10% above and below the quota cutoffs. Each panel in this figure is constructed using the following procedure for 
observations within 10% of the ethnic quota cutoffs: (i) regress the log of transaction prices on smooth functions of ethnic proportions centered around the 
quota cutoffs (4th order polynomials) and a dummy that is 1 when the corresponding block quota is binding in the previous month; (ii) plot the predicted prices 
(solid line) as well as the 95% confidence interval (dashed lines); (iii) plot means of ln(price) for each 1% bin. I repeat the exercise for the Malay quotas and 
Indian quotas. Standard errors clustered at the block level. Reported p-values correspond to the hypothesis test that the discontinuity at the cutoff is 0. The 



















               a. Probability that the Chinese Quota Binds 
 
Deviation in Percent Chinese in a Block Relative to the Quota Cutoff 
 
 
b. Probability that the Malay Quota Binds 
 
Deviation in Percent Malay in a Block Relative to the Quota Cutoff 
 
c. Probability that the Indian Quota Binds 
 
Deviation in Percent Indian in a Block Relative to the Quota Cutoff 
 
 
Fig. 3. Testing for discontinuity in the probability that the quota binds. Each panel in this figure is constructed by regressing Qbt (a dummy for whether the 
quota is binding for block b in month t) on a dummy that is 1 when the ethnic proportions are above the block quota cutoff and 4th order polynomials of ethnic 
proportions, centered around the quota cutoffs, then plotting the predicted probabilities. Repeat the exercise for the Malay quotas and Indian quotas. The 
dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors clustered at the block level. The coefficient estimates are 23%, 12% and 10% for Chinese, 



















































a. Density of percent of Chinese in a block 
  
Percent Chinese in a Block 
 
 
b. Density of percent of Malays in a block 
   
Percent Malay in a Block 
 
c. Density of percent of Indians in a block 
   
Percent Indian in a Block Relative to the Quota 
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